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Abstract
In the 1960s, countries in Southeast Asia such as Indonesia and Malaysia were wreaked by ethnic violence.
Race riots broke out in Malaysia in 1969 between Chinese and Malays. In 1973 and 1974 anti-Chinese riots
and pogroms erupted in Indonesia. Amidst a sea of ethnic unrest, the Singaporean government became aware
that the multiethnic nature of Singapore rendered it vulnerable to riots.Memories of the 1964 race riots and
the 1950 Maria Hertogh riots were still fresh. The government hoped that the creation of a cohesive national
identity would reduce the risk of ethnic and racial violence. In this project I examine the development of
national identity in Singapore from 1965-1990 to see how the government and civil society interacted to
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Introduction 
An ex-British colony, the city-state of Singapore became independent after a merger with 
Malaysia (initiated in 1963) failed after two short years At the point of independence in 1965, the 
island was a mere 581.5 square kilometers in size – smaller than some lakes in the United States.1 
Located off the southern tip of peninsular Malaysia, with whom relations were now tense, and with 
few to no natural resources of its own, the country faced immense challenges right from birth.  
Singapore’s earliest leaders harbored no illusions about the difficulties of the task they 
faced – survival was by no means guaranteed. They had seen merger with Malaysia as the sole 
viable route for Singapore to survive outside colonial control, and now that that was no longer an 
option, the leaders felt that they had been thrown in the deep end. Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s first 
Prime Minister and respected to this day as the figure most responsible for shaping Singapore’s 
development, said in his memoirs that Singapore faced “tremendous odds with an improbable 
chance of survival. Singapore was not a natural country but man-made, a trading post the British 
had developed into a nodal point in their world-wide maritime empire. We inherited the island 
without its hinterland, a heart without a body.”2  
In the coming decades, the People’s Action Party (PAP), the dominant political party in 
Singapore which was co-founded by Lee and his colleagues, would lead the country in its meteoric 
rise – from a state whose very viability was in severe doubt, to one of the most developed and 
richest countries not just in the region, but globally. Not all aspects of the city appeared to have 
developed equally, though. Its wealth reserves swelled exponentially, skyscrapers sprouted from 
the ground and punctuated the night sky with glass, steel, and light to create a skyline familiar to 
                                                     
1 “Land area of the Republic of Singapore,” Department of Biological Sciences, National University of Singapore. 
http://www.dbs.nus.edu.sg/staff/details/hugh_tan/Ch4%20Waste-%20and%20Reclaimed%20Land%20p.%2078.pdf  
2 Kuan Yew, Lee, From Third World to First (Singapore: Times Media Private Limited, 2000): 19 
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many around the world, and its ports linked the new metropolis to other global cities worldwide. 
Yet some felt that the rapid pace of economic development had come at a significant cost. In 
particular, Singapore was felt to have become a “cultural desert” – a term which even the PAP 
itself came to accept as an apt description of the state of the country in the decades after 
independence. How did this come to pass?  
This thesis seeks to understand the development of arts and culture in modern Singapore, 
in particular its relationship with the government and official government policies. As will become 
clear, to solely describe Singapore as a “cultural desert” vastly oversimplifies a story that is far 
more complicated, and an arts and cultural scene that is far richer, than the phrase conveys. Due 
to constraints on time and space available, this thesis cannot – and does not attempt to – provide a 
comprehensive rundown of all the various cultural and artistic traditions and practices throughout 
Singapore’s history, or look at all aspects of government policy relating to or affecting those 
scenes. Rather, this thesis will zoom in on some particularly significant moments and events in the 
immediate post-independence decades (1965-1990) which may be of interest to the lay reader. 
This account will also place an emphasis on the personal experiences of those involved in the 
issues discussed here – artists, policymakers, and civil servants alike.  
In order to better contextualize the study, a discussion of the conditions under which 
Singapore achieved independence is necessary. This, after all, was the environment in which 
Singapore’s political leaders effectively went through a baptism of fire. After independence, their 
methods of governance and approach towards governing would be heavily influenced by the events 
surrounding the time of independence.  
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Modern Singapore was originally a small fishing village, colonized by the British and 
turned into a major port. During World War II, the island fell quickly to the Japanese onslaught in 
one of the worst British defeats in history. After suffering through two years of brutal occupation, 
the British returned to take control of the island again after the end of the war. Unlike many other 
colonies, Singapore showed no interest in fighting for its independence with physical violence. 
Rather, political leaders worked to persuade the British to grant Singapore a merger with Malaya 
(Singapore’s immediate northern peninsular neighbor), also a British colony. The merger 
eventually happened in 1963, with Singapore merging with Malaya (along with two other 
territories, Sabah and Sarawak) to form the Federation of Malaysia. Despite having left direct 
British control, many British remained in Singapore, including elements of the British armed 
forces.  
However, the merger turned sour within the year. Concerns had erupted over what the 
UMNO (United Malays National Organization) government, seated in Malaysia, saw as the 
potential unbalancing of the racial populations in Malaysia, which thus far had a significant 
majority of Malays. Singapore, as an island with a large Chinese majority, threatened to upset this 
balance upon its entry into the Federation of Malaysia. This was important as UMNO’s position 
embraced affirmative action for the Malay majority (bumiputras) whereas Singaporean politicians 
claimed to be in favor of an equal playing field, resulting in a heated debate over whether there 
should be a “Malayan Malaysia” (a Malaysia centered around Malays as a race) or a “Malaysian 
Malaysia” (a Malaysia centered around Malaysians, as citizens, regardless of race). Racial tensions 
had already been rife in the region, and severe riots erupted along racial lines in 1964 in Singapore.  
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After the riots, some members of the PAP attributed them to deliberate attempts to stir up 
grassroots sentiment by Malay extremists from Malaysia. Lee Khoon Choy, for one, stated his 
belief that the PAP’s electoral victory in the Singaporean constituencies of Geylang Serai, 
Kampong Kembangan,3 and the Southern Islands (despite those being Malay-dominated areas) 
against candidates officially backed by UMNO (and having received a visit from the Tunku 
himself, the leader of Malaysia and UMNO, the day before the election4) contributed to the 
outbreak of the riots. More specifically, he identified the campaigns conducted by UMNO 
members as an attempt to “show that the Singapore PAP government is anti-Malay.”5 Othman 
Wok, a Malay member of the PAP, quoted evidence which in his mind suggested that outside 
forces (extremist UMNO members) had instigated the riots: “I believe the riot was planned; it did 
not erupt spontaneously,” citing a conversation he had with an Utusan Melayu (extremist Malay 
newspaper) reporter who claimed to have foreknowledge of the riots happening.6 Lee Kuan Yew 
himself, in a speech on the night of 21st July, said: “All the indications show that there has been 
organization and planning behind this outbreak to turn it into an ugly communal clash.”7During 
the 1964 election, Malay members of the PAP were taunted, branded as traitors and infidels (to 
the Malay race), and had posters defaced with human feces – and all in Singapore.8  
                                                     
3 A kampong/kampung is a traditional Malay village. Here, it has become part of the name of a district (Kampong Kembangan), 
in the same way that the word “City” has become part of the name of the area known as “New York City.” 
 
4 Sonny Yap, Richard Lim, and Weng Kam Leong, Men in White: The Untold Story of Singapore’s Ruling Political Party 
(Singapore: Singapore Press Holdings Limited, 2009): 261 
 
5 Khoon Choy, Lee. Interview with Audrey Lee. Tape recording. January 13th, 1981. National Archives of Singapore. 
 
6 Yap et al, Men in White, 280 
7 Kuan Yew, Lee “Broadcast by the Prime Minister” (Speech, Broadcast, July 21st, 1964) 
http://drm.a2o.nas.sg/DJVUServer/PdfStampServlet?app=stars&filepath=pdfdoc/lky19640721.pdf 
8 Yap et al, Men in White, 284 
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Despite differing accounts of how the riots had broken out,9 one thing was not in doubt. 
Both among the leadership and the people, the riots were, at heart, about race. Indeed the 
statements made by leaders in the aftermath and actions taken demonstrated a racial reading of 
events. In his 21st July speech, Lee referred to “a few deaths both among Chinese and Malays,” 
showing his understanding of the clash as happening along racial lines, and the need for “harmony 
between our communities [to be] preserved.”10 In an address on 24th July, he cited an example of 
a Chinese and Malay group which had managed to avoid violent conflict by speaking about their 
fears of each other, and exhorted citizens to follow their example.11 For example, the government 
set up “goodwill committees” in twelve constituencies where “large Malay kampongs adjoin 
Chinese villages” where “local village elders and kampong ketuas, together with members of the 
Citizens Consultative Committees, with Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries have gone round 
to set up Goodwill Liaison Committees to restore morals and confidence.”12 This was soon 
extended to all 51 electoral wards,13 In later discourse, leaders would emphasize anecdotal 
evidence of members of both races risking life and limb to help the other in times of pressure, 
further entrenching the racial element of the narrative even as they sought to overcome those 
differences.14  
                                                     
9 Ibid, 279 
10 Kuan Yew, Lee “Broadcast by the Prime Minister” (Speech, Broadcast, July 21st, 1964) 
http://drm.a2o.nas.sg/DJVUServer/PdfStampServlet?app=stars&filepath=pdfdoc/lky19640721.pdf 




13 Men in White, 282 
 
14 Ibid. 
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Amidst these concerns, Singapore was forcibly handed an independence it never really 
wanted. E.W. Barker, a Singaporean politician, member of the PAP and one of the key drafters of 
the Proclamation of Singapore, recalled in an interview the key role played by race: “I think the 
last straw that broke the camel’s back as it were, was a debate in Parliament in April 1965 where 
Lee Kuan Yew got up and spoke for the first time in that House in Malay… it was a tremendous 
performance… Usually, the Prime Minister spoke in English… And from then, they thought they’d 
better push us out.” 15 Speaking at a press conference on 9th August 1965, the day that Singapore 
became independent, Lee said:  
“...when I first met the Tengku [Malaysia’s leader] at 12.30 on Saturday morning, I was 
still not convinced that… there was no other way. I believed then that I could still 
convince… Tengku that there were a number of other ways of reducing communal tensions 
in Malaysia, such as a looser federation… after what he told me when we were alone, I 
realized there was no other way than what he thought was the solution, that we had to leave 
Malaysia.”16  
During that very press conference, Lee also stated: “For me, [separation] is a moment of 
anguish because all my life… I have believed in Merger and the unity of these two territories…”17 
At this moment, Lee famously broke down in an incident (and image) etched into Singaporean 
history, and the recording had to be stopped for him to compose himself. Those who were there 
recalled the fact of independence as shocking, leaving them “at a loss” – separation was “heart-
rending” for Singapore’s leadership.18  
                                                     
15 E.W. Barker, Interview with Tan Kay Chee. Tape recording. July 8th, 1982. National Archives of Singapore. 
16 Kuan Yew, Lee “Press Conference” (Press Conference, Broadcasting House, August 9th, 1965), 
http://drm.a2o.nas.sg/DJVUServer/PdfStampServlet?app=stars&filepath=pdfdoc/lky19650809b.pdf 
17 Ibid. 
18 Yap et al, Men in White, 302-303. 
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Ultimately, the specter of racial conflict would hang like a sword of Damocles over 
Singapore’s newly independent state, even as it enjoyed increasing wealth and fortune. Lee Kuan 
Yew says that he knew from the beginning that “it was crucial to keep united Singapore’s 
multilingual, multicultural, multi-religious society, and make it rugged and dynamic enough to 
compete in world markets.”19 How then are we to understand the claims of those like ex-Prime 
Minister Goh Chok Tong, Lee’s successor? He acknowledged that “up till the early 1980s, we 
focused mainly on achieving economic growth and raising per capita income. So Singapore was 
widely mocked as a ‘cultural desert’, a ‘sterile’ place where the main preoccupations of 
Singaporeans were makan [eating] and making money.”20 Did Singapore have a national identity, 
or a focus on creating this identity, at the time of independence? 
As mentioned earlier, Lee Kuan Yew stated that he believed that a sense of national identity 
was important from the outset precisely because Singapore was a “disparate collection of 
immigrants” – something that some scholars call an “originary identity deficit”.21 The fact that this 
would have been key is echoed by Benedict Andersen, who notes that the past is often important 
to any conception of national identity: “If nation-states are widely conceded to be ‘new’ and 
‘historical’, the nations to which they give political expression always loom out of an immemorial 
past.”22 From this point of view, Singapore historically did not have much sense of a unique 
identity and community. When Singapore is discussed, it is as a geographic location where Malay 
and Chinese nationalists, for example, would operate, instead of a self-aware community with 
                                                     
19 Lee, From Third World to First, 24 
 
20 Chok Tong, Goh “Singapore: Global City of Buzz, Home for Us” (Speech, Nanyang Technological University, October 29th, 
2010) http://www.news.gov.sg/public/sgpc/en/media_releases/agencies/micacsd/speech/S-20101029-1.html 
21 Jon Stratton and Ien Ang. “The Singapore Way of Multiculturalism : Western Concepts / Asian Cultures.” Sojourn: Journal of 
Social Issues in Southeast Asia 10, no. 1 (1995): 76. 
22 Benedict Andersen. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. (London: Verso Books, 
2006): 11. 
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nationalists fighting for, or over, it. Historian Nicholas Tarling’s omission of any mention of 
“Singaporean nationalism” in a chapter on Southeast Asian nationalism in the pre-World War II 
period is telling.23 Singapore is unlike countries like the Philippines, which had independence 
movements as early as the 1930s and nationalist, anti-US imperialist movements even earlier; or 
Burma, where the government appealed to “popular Burman tradition” in implementing its welfare 
state policies. Malaysia had a “myth of indigenous origin” and Indonesia had a “history of heroic 
struggle for independence against colonial oppression”24 to appeal to for a sense of common 
purpose or national unity. Singapore, however, had “no local pre-colonial past to be excavated and 
recuperated for a national cultural narrative… for the newly independent state.”25 
While Lee stated that Singapore indeed had no such unifying identity or culture, what he 
says next – that the government had to find some way to keep the people united – has been the 
sentiment of many academics writing on the subject. Chang, writing as early as 1968, argued that 
the creation of a cohesive identity was key from the beginning, because internal racial conflict was 
the most serious threat to Singapore. Along with the tense relationship with Malaysia and the 
subversive activities of Communists, he argued, the government had to create a cohesive identity 
to override the animosity of the past.26 Tan proposes a candidate for this identity in the form of a 
“garrison mentality”, which he says has been used to guard the country’s “territorial, natural and 
                                                     
23 Nicholas Tarling. Southeast Asia: A Modern History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001): 360-396 
 
24 Jon Stratton and Ien Ang. “The Singapore Way of Multiculturalism : Western Concepts / Asian Cultures.” Sojourn: Journal of 
Social Issues in Southeast Asia 10, no. 1 (1995): 76. 
25 Huat, C. “Taking Group Rights Seriously : Multiracialism in Singapore. Perth, Australia” (2005) 
http://wwwarc.murdoch.edu.au/publications/wp/wp124.pdf 
26 David Chang, “Nation-Building in Singapore.” Asian Survey 8, no. 9 (1968): 766–67 
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cultural resources”, and which has been effective at recruiting manpower for defense.27 Stratton 
argues that the fear of outside enemies is a common strategy among nation-states which wish to 
create a sense of cohesion; Singapore is unique in its invocation of the fear that it is not a “properly 
constituted nation-state (defined, of course, in the modern Western sense).”28  
However, even those academics who did argue that Singapore had a national identity 
confined their analysis to a state-imposed ideology. There is comparatively little analysis of the 
role played by civil society in helping to create a national identity and culture. Some scholars such 
as John Clammer, Stephen Ortmann, and so on touch on civil society and the arts only insofar as 
they are responded to by the government. Lily Kong’s work on moral panics and rock music in 
Singapore, as an additional example, similarly chooses to focus mostly on the reaction of the 
government to the rising tide of rock music.29 Generally, there is a lack of emphasis on the role 
played by civil society in helping to define and shape identity, with it often being reduced to a 
reaction to government policy. Seen only as a supporting actor in the drama of Singaporean history, 
the arts have not received the historical analysis which is due them.   
Despite the existence of a fairly strong corpus of uniquely Singaporean literature and 
drama, for instance, little research has been done into how these works reflect grassroots sentiment 
about Singaporean identity. Despite being labelled “breakthrough[s]” and “canonical in any 
                                                     
27 Kenneth Tan, “Civic Society and the New Economy in Patriarchal Singapore : Emasculating the Political, Feminizing the 
Public and the New Economy Emasculating Political , the Singaporean.” Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies 15, no. 2 (2001): 97 
28 Jon Stratton and Ien Ang. “The Singapore Way of Multiculturalism : Western Concepts / Asian Cultures.” Sojourn: Journal of 
Social Issues in Southeast Asia 10, no. 1 (1995): 76. 
29 Lily Kong, “Music and Moral Geographies : Constructions of ‘Nation’ and Identity in Singapore.” GeoJournal 65, no. 1 
(2006): 103–111. 
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history of Singapore drama,” the plays Emily of Emerald Hill and The Coffin is Too Big for the 
Hole are offered only 3 pages in The Routledge Concise History of Southeast Asian Writing in 
English.30 There is clearly space for a close reading of texts such as these and Catherine Lim’s 
short stories, linking them to larger debates about the history of Singaporean culture. The latter 
were also used as set texts for the national ‘O’ Level examinations, demonstrating their cultural 
significance to Singaporeans at large. There is also considerable room for analysis of how these 
artists and writers saw themselves as representing Singaporean society.  
Current academia also neglects the personal experiences of many of these individuals, 
which is key to understanding how and why many of these people did what they did. Neither 
“government” nor “artists” can be understood as monolithic entities. Even within the artistic world, 
for example, artists, writers, and playwrights frequently disagreed with each other on how best to 
portray Singaporeans, artistic methods, or the approach they ought to take when negotiating with 
the government. Within the government individuals at different levels – Members of Parliament, 
bureaucrats, civil servants, top leaders – also often had differing understandings of the reasons 
why particular policies were implemented, on top of looking at issues through different lenses. 
New information and perspectives which have only recently become publicly available also 
present opportunities for analysis. For example, although the role of the press has been dealt with 
to some extent by academics, the recent publication of the memoirs of Cheong Yip Seng, ex-chief 
editor of Singapore’s main newspaper, the Straits Times, offers a fertile, untapped source for 
historical study and research. This thesis will attempt to fill in this gap not only by examining some 
of the published recollections of individuals like Cheong, but also by examining some of the 
                                                     
30 R.S. Patke and P. Holden, The Routledge Concise History of Southeast Asian Writing in English (New York: Routledge, 2010): 
132-135 
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records at Singapore’s National Archives, focusing on the oral history interviews, to understand 
what life and work was like for artists, civil servants, and policymakers who had to grapple with 
many of these issues on a day-to-day basis. In addition, interviews have been conducted with some 
figures who are seminal in the history of Singaporean art and who saw themselves as having 
something to say about Singaporean identity, such as Catherine Lim (mentioned above). There is 
therefore ample room for a historical analysis of the development of the arts scene and national 
identity in Singapore.  
In order to come to grips with the issue, we will begin with a discussion of the mindset of 
the government starting in the immediate post-independence years in the first chapter. 
Understanding the major concerns of the government will better allow us to understand the 
methods and mindset which it adopted as it approached civil society. The government’s dealings 
with artists and writers will be the focus of the second chapter. As mentioned, the focus will be 
placed on understanding the perspectives of various individuals involved. Through this chapter, 
we will see the ways in which the government attempted to regulate and control the arts scene. 
Taken together with the first chapter, we will examine the ways in which the government decided 
to address questions of identity to deal with its concern for the security of the nation.  In the third 
and last chapter, we will see how the artists and writers reacted to government policies, and how 
they criticized, challenged, or changed the narratives created by the government relating to politics 
and national identity. 
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Chapter One  
We begin our story at the point of Singapore’s independence in 1965. Singapore’s turbulent 
birth had led its leaders to conclude that survival was by no means guaranteed. Alone in the world, 
without a hinterland or resources, and having experienced great trauma of a kind in the past couple 
of years, the leaders of the newborn nation had insecurities of two particular types: first, a fear of 
external threats, and second, a fear of internal threats.  
External threats were front and center in the imaginations of Singaporean statesmen. At the 
time of independence, Lee’s appraisal of the most important challenges facing Singapore was 
clear. He used one of his last statements at the press conference announcing separation (on 9th 
August 1965) to reassure Singaporeans that “the [British military] bases will be there, your 
protection will be there, co-operation in defence, security will be there and the water agreement is 
firm and solid, and guaranteed.”31 Referring to what would soon become common refrains in the 
lexicon of Singapore’s leaders as they continually reminded the population of Singapore’s unique 
vulnerability – Singapore’s dependence on Malaysia for water, lack of a standing army, and 
dependence on British military bases not just for defense but for a substantial amount of 
employment and revenue – this was an early and definite indicator of the issues foremost on Lee’s 
mind.32 The very first substantive chapter of Lee’s memoirs (after an introduction which serves to 
go over the conditions under which separation occurred) is entitled Building an Army from Scratch, 
                                                     
31 Kuan Yew, Lee “Press Conference” (Press Conference, Broadcasting House, August 9th, 1965), 
http://drm.a2o.nas.sg/DJVUServer/PdfStampServlet?app=stars&filepath=pdfdoc/lky19650809b.pdf 
32 As of 2011, Lee remained convinced of the importance of the military dangers faced by Singapore. Speaking to reporters in 
2011, he said of that mindset, which has informed Singapore’s policy and growth trajectory over the past half-century: “I’m 
concerned that Singaporeans assume that Singapore is a normal country, that we can be compared to Denmark or New Zealand… 
We are in a very turbulent region. We have not got neighbors who want to help us prosper… They can besiege you. You’ll be 
dead…”  
Reference: Fook Kwang, Han et al. Lee Kuan Yew: Hard Truths to Keep Singapore Going (Singapore: Straits Times Press, 
2011), 25-30 
State of the Arts: Government, National Identity, and the Arts in Singapore 
13 | P a g e  
2013-2014 Penn Humanities Forum Andrew W. Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final 
Paper, May 2014. Shawn Teo, College of Arts and Sciences 2014, University of Pennsylvania.  
 
which demonstrates Lee’s commitment to the identification of defense as the top priority. In a 
speech in Parliament in 1965 promoting the Singapore Army Bill, Minister of Defense Goh Keng 
Swee stated: “…the island [could] be over-run by any neighboring country within a radius of 1000 
miles, if any of them cared to do so. And everyone… can see that at least one of them do care very 
much to do so (sic).”33 
Simultaneously, though, the threat was not seen to come solely from other countries – to 
some extent military threats could originate within Singaporean territory. Goh, at the Inauguration 
Dinner for the Board of Governors of the National Youth Leadership Training Centre in October 
1965, identified as key concerns “anti-democratic and anti-national movements” which would 
assault the state through “political subversion or other means.”34 Similarly, in another speech in 
Parliament on the topic of the People’s Association (Amendment) Bill, he stated that Communists 
were using kindergarten classes (particularly in rural areas) to indoctrinate young children, 
comparing these efforts to subversion attempts in ancient imperial China. To solve this problem 
and yet avoid angering parents, he claimed that it was necessary to have kindergarten classes run 
by community centers.35 Another speech by Goh earlier in the year made clear the PAP 
government’s fear of the possibility that these very instruments, designed and supposed to prevent 
subversive activities, might themselves be compromised. Goh referred to a period in 1961 when 
“pro-Communist and pro-Indonesian groups” within the People’s Association staged a strike. The 
strike was ultimately shut down, but the lesson was learnt – the staff involved were dismissed, new 
                                                     
33 Keng Swee, Goh, “The Singapore Army Bill” (Speech, Parliament of Singapore, December 23rd, 1965),  
http://drm.a2o.nas.sg/DJVUServer/PdfStampServlet?app=stars&filepath=pdfdoc/PressR19651223c.pdf 
34 Keng Swee, Goh, “Speech at the Inauguration Dinner for Board of Governors of the National Youth Leadership Training 
Center” (Speech, Singapore, October 14th, 1965), 
http://drm.a2o.nas.sg/DJVUServer/PdfStampServlet?app=stars&filepath=pdfdoc/PressR19651014.pdf 
35 Keng Swee, Goh, “People’s Association (Amendment) Bill” (Speech, Parliament of Singapore, December 24th, 1965), 
http://drm.a2o.nas.sg/DJVUServer/PdfStampServlet?app=stars&filepath=pdfdoc/PressR19651224c.pdf 
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staff recruited, and future recruitment drives for similar bodies made sure to take on only those 
with “good educational background, and with good character.”36 
It was understood that the “internal threats” did not come solely from militarized elements 
(such as the Communist groups) which apparently aimed to tear down the new state. The traumas 
of independence in particular had forced the government to recognize the severe threat posed by 
potential racial and ethnic strife, or even divisions within racial groups due to differences in 
geographical origin. One particularly overt manifestation of such differences were the cultural or 
clan associations which dotted Singapore’s map at the time. Lee noted that people had historically 
created associations or clan associations on the basis of geographical origin, “whether it be from 
Kwantung or Fukien in China, or from Madras or Kerala in India, or from Bawean or Sulawesi or 
Sumatra in Indonesia.” Significant forces within the community therefore continued to emphasize 
their ethnic, geographical, or racial identities over their national identities at the point of 
independence, creating a challenge for a government which saw this system of priorities as deeply 
dangerous to national unity.  
In general, the circumstances under which independence was achieved and the memories of 
the past created a mindset among the leaders of Singapore that the state was intensely vulnerable. 
It was vulnerable not just to foreign powers, who might seek to take advantage of the state’s small 
size and lack of defensive capabilities, but also from within. It was claimed that there were 
“subversive elements” which wanted to overthrow the government, but leaders were also 
                                                     
36 Keng Swee, Goh, “People’s Association Corporation Meeting” (Speech, Singapore, September 17th, 1965). 
http://drm.a2o.nas.sg/DJVUServer/PdfStampServlet?app=stars&filepath=pdfdoc/PressR19650917a.pdf 
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preoccupied with the nascent tensions between races and religions, exacerbated by the conditions 
and events of the past few years, which, it was feared, might tear the new state apart.  
a. The balancing act of race 
Lee had recognized that Singaporeans came from all manner of different countries, and even 
within those countries often came from disparate regions with very different histories, cultures, 
and languages. On the whole, in the post-independence years, the PAP government approached 
the issue of race from two major strategic angles. First, they attempted to minimize the number of 
different groups which they had to acknowledge had claims to the government’s attention, often 
by forcibly overlooking differences between various “subsets” of the “major races” and essentially 
forcing a degree of homogenization on each of them. Second, they tried to ensure “harmony” (or 
at the very least peaceful coexistence) between the various racial groups, with the specter of racial 
clashes still fresh in their minds. 
The experience of the “Chinese” community forms a good example of the former. Just within 
the “Chinese”, major groupings include (but are not limited to) the Hokkien (from southern Fujian 
in China), Teochew (from eastern Guangdong), and the Cantonese (from Hong Kong and southern 
Guangdong). Each group has its own dialect, cultural traditions and so on. “Clan associations” had 
formed to promote solidarity and provide for needs such as shelter, food, jobs, religious worship, 
and so on, especially among the large community of fresh immigrants who would feel less out of 
place with a ready-made community of their fellows organized and in strength in Singapore.37  
                                                     
37 Lim Keak, Cheng, “Reflections on the Changing Roles of Chinese Clan Associations in Singapore.” Asian Culture, 14 (1990): 
57.  
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The government recognized the risk that such clan organizations could promote loyalty to the 
clan or race above the nation, and took strong steps to ensure that this would not occur. For one, 
the government specifically refused to endorse, accept, or even legitimize by recognizing, any of 
the activities such associations had historically been deeply involved with as these activities were 
often targeted only at very specific groups. At the installation ceremony of the Eighth Management 
Committee of the Yang Clan General Association on 29th January 1966, Minister for Health, and 
adviser to the Clan, Yong Nyuk Lin made a speech which specifically avoided reference to any of 
the clan’s traditional activities in promoting solidarity among Yang clan members. Instead, the 
speech contained only stock government rhetoric about the importance of building up an armed 
forces, two sentences on education measures implemented by the government, and to exhort those 
listening to avoid littering.38 The very next year, Yong delivered a speech to the same clan entitled 
“National interest comes first.” This speech ruminated on the economic difficulties faced by the 
country before seguing into an interesting line with broad implications for political philosophy, 
whether Yong intended it to or not: after speaking about how the Government had a duty to be 
“righteous” and “not corrupt,” and should “have good policies and plans of action for the welfare 
and happiness of its peoples,” he stated: “The majority of its people must also support such 
governmental policies; be prepared to work hard and to make sacrifices for [the] common good.”39 
This is interesting for two reasons: first, the notion that just as there are governmental duties to the 
citizens, so are there duties of the citizen to the “nation” or “state”; and second, the idea that among 
these duties are support for governmental policies. These would go on to become frequently raised 
                                                     
38 Nyuk Lin, Yong, “Installation Ceremony of the Eighth Management Committee” (Speech, People’s Association, January 29 th, 
1966),  http://drm.a2o.nas.sg/DJVUServer/PdfStampServlet?app=stars&filepath=pdfdoc/PressR19660129d.pdf 
 
39 Nyuk Lin, Yong, “17th Anniversary Dinner of the Yang Clan General Association” (Speech, Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 
June 10th, 1967), http://drm.a2o.nas.sg/DJVUServer/PdfStampServlet?app=stars&filepath=pdfdoc/PressR19670610a.pdf 
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by Singaporean leaders in any dialogue or elaboration on their thinking about how governance 
ought to proceed.  
The statements of Yong’s successor to the position of Minister of Health, Chua Sian Chin (at 
the opening of new premises of the Singapore Chee Yang Chai Clan Association in 1969) provided 
further direct illumination of the way in which the government perceived clan associations. The 
clan organization had been useful “in the days of the early immigrant settlements where there was 
very little law and order,” but “now that we are independent and as a nation are responsible for our 
own defense and security, the people have developed wider loyalties – our first and foremost 
loyalty now is to our nation and state which gives us protection.”40 The state had aimed to, and 
succeeded in, supplanting the clan organization as a superior provider of physical and economic 
security, and so moved to argue that it was thus more deserving of the fundamental loyalties of 
citizens.  
Instead of wiping out clan associations by banning them or depriving them of all resources, 
however, the PAP government acted to co-opt them, something which Chua references, although, 
as Lee did with community centers earlier, he attributed it to citizen leadership rather than to 
governmental policy:  
But this does not mean that the clan association has no place in our present day society. On 
the contrary… our people have adapted it to serve the needs of a changing environment… 
present day clan organizations have therefore been oriented to do most useful work in the 
field of mutual aid whereby clansmen can do their bit to help the needy, the aged and the 
sick among fellow clansmen besides doing other forms of charitable work. Thus our 
cultural heritage is not only being preserved but is being put to good use in our present day 
society.41 
                                                     
40 Sian Chin, Chua, “Official Opening of the New Premises of the Singapore Chee Yang Chai Clan Association” (Speech, 
Singapore Chee Yang Chai Clan Association, January 1st, 1969), 
http://drm.a2o.nas.sg/DJVUServer/PdfStampServlet?app=stars&filepath=pdfdoc/PressR19690101.pdf 
41 Ibid. 
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Even then, in the realm of social aid, culture and recreation, the clan associations were often ill-
equipped to compete with comparatively well-funded government-run community centers, which, 
were deliberately located in public housing estates42 and which were, of course, designed to 
embrace people of different clan, ethnic, and racial backgrounds.  
In the end, the dilution of the clan associations was seen as a victory by the government. Their 
aim of blunting the possible divisive impact of clan associations discriminating sharply on 
geographical or other bases had been achieved. Indeed Lee claimed that the community centers, 
by being forced to expand their bases beyond their original constituencies, had “played a valuable 
role in the social integration of our society... it represented the urge of a community to discover 
themselves.” This was possible because community centers, he argued, had created opportunities 
for interaction between those from different backgrounds. Importantly, he also noted that the 
“emergence of citizen leadership” in directing the community centers was a hallmark of progress43 
– an approach to civil society which the government would rarely replicate in future. It is important 
to highlight his claim that this process of interaction with different groups was one initiated by the 
community, which wanted to “discover itself.” As we have already seen, there is little evidence to 
suggest that many of these clan associations had acted voluntarily. Rather, it was a concerted and 
directed government effort which, rightly or wrongly, removed the clan associations as significant 
actors in the Singaporean political landscape. 
b. Language and inherited “culture” 
                                                     
42 Cheng, “Reflections on the Changing Roles of Chinese Clan Associations in Singapore,” 61. 
43 Kuan Yew, Lee, “Opening of People’s Association Conference” (Speech, Singapore Conference Hall, January 8 th, 1966) 
http://drm.a2o.nas.sg/DJVUServer/PdfStampServlet?app=stars&filepath=pdfdoc/lky19660108.pdf  
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On the whole, the government sought to delegitimize geographical background and clan group 
as a means of self-identification. It quickly focused on the most important signifiers of one’s 
allegiance, such as language, as a signifier of race. The Constitution of the Republic of Singapore 
clearly demonstrated the mandatory homogenization of the languages of “racial” groups. It stated 
that “Malay, Mandarin, Tamil and English shall be the 4 official languages in Singapore.”44 
Despite the existence and common usage of dialects like Hokkien and Cantonese – arguably even 
more prolific than Mandarin Chinese – the government chose to make Mandarin Chinese one of 
the national languages, in large part because they then would not be perceived as being biased 
towards any particular grouping and risk inciting unhappiness. In 1978, Goh Keng Swee, who 
would become Minister for Education the following year, issued a hugely influential report which 
later came to be known as the Goh Report. A close reading of some parts of the Report reveals 
how deep the problems of language were, even 13 years after independence. The report lamented 
the bilingual (English and Mandarin, for the most part) school system as “unnatural” as “eighty-
five per cent of [school children] do not speak either of these languages at home.” The report 
suggested, as an analogy, “children in England [being] taught Russian and Mandarin, while they 
continue to speak English at home.” This discrepancy led to immense problems within the 
education system – for instance, more than sixty per cent of school children failed one or both of 
their language examinations.45  
                                                     





45 Keng Swee, Goh et al, “Report on the Ministry of Education” (Report, February 10th, 1979), 
http://drm.a2o.nas.sg/DJVUServer/PdfStampServlet?app=stars&filepath=pdfdoc/956--1979-02-10.pdf 
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It was partly in response to this that Lee Kuan Yew, in 1979, kicked off a campaign to “Promote 
the Use of Mandarin.” Lee recognized in the opening speech for this campaign that “the Chinese 
we speak is divided up among more than twelve dialects,” and that dialect use was “widespread 
and dominant” throughout Chinese society in Singapore. Ultimately, he identified the problem as 
one of a competition between dialects and Mandarin. The speech is worth quoting at length: 
The continued use of dialect, after Mandarin has already been learnt, makes a person lose his 
fluency in Mandarin… all Chinese parents face this choice for their children – English-
Mandarin, or English-dialect… the government will take administrative action to support [the 
learning of Mandarin instead of dialects by children]. All government officers, including those 
in hospitals and clinics, and especially those in manning counters, will be instructed to speak 
Mandarin except to the old, those over sixty. All Chinese taxi-drivers, bus conductors, and 
hawkers, can and will be required to pass an oral Mandarin test, or to attend Mandarin classes 
to make them adequate and competent to understand and speak Mandarin to their customers… 
Students will hear and speak Mandarin in the streets, on the buses, in the shops, in the hawkers’ 
centers… This is the stark choice – English-Mandarin, or English-dialect. Logically, the 
decision is obvious. Emotionally, the choice is painful.46 
As part of this effort, advertisements were run in The Straits Times, the largest newspaper in 
Singapore, promoting the use of Mandarin. This was just one example:47 
                                                     
46 Kuan Yew, Lee, “Opening Ceremony of the Promote the Use of Mandarin Campaign” (Speech, Singapore Conference Hall, 
September 7th, 1979), http://drm.a2o.nas.sg/DJVUServer/PdfStampServlet?app=stars&filepath=pdfdoc/lky19790907.pdf 
47 “Don’t be Shy!” The Straits Times, December 21st, 1979, 21, http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Page/straitstimes19791221-
1.1.21.aspx 
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The same advertisement was run numerous times in the paper. This statement, unattributed 
to any individual or organization despite being in the “Forum” section (which carries letters from 
readers), places the onus on each individual to use Mandarin instead of dialect. By representing 
the predominant obstacle to the use of Mandarin (as opposed to dialect) as one simply of 
communication – “the other person may know Mandarin but may also be shy” – it necessarily 
overlooked the other reasons why dialect use was common, for example, the cultural and 
traditional aspects of one’s clan background for which dialect may have been an integral part. Lee 
said: “We must keep the core of our value systems and social mores… our children… must be 
Mandarin-speaking, able to read the books, the proverbs, the parables, the stories of heroes and 
villains, so that they know what a good upright man should do and be… [Mandarin] must gradually 
take over the role of dialects as the lingua franca of Chinese Singaporeans.”48 The cultural heritage 
                                                     
48 Kuan Yew, Lee, “The need to encourage young to speak Mandarin” The Straits Times, March 13th, 1978, 10, 
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State of the Arts: Government, National Identity, and the Arts in Singapore 
22 | P a g e  
2013-2014 Penn Humanities Forum Andrew W. Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final 
Paper, May 2014. Shawn Teo, College of Arts and Sciences 2014, University of Pennsylvania.  
 
of the Chinese population became associated solely with Mandarin Chinese, and not with the 
dialects. One sole homogenized idea of Chinese “identity” and “heritage” became prized above all 
other variations, and this was reified in the policy towards dialects. 
On the other hand, competition between the major languages was also understood to have 
been a problem. Despite being overwhelmingly Chinese in terms of demographics, the 
Constitution provided that Malay should be the national language,49 leading to unhappiness among 
some Chinese. A statement was issued by the Prime Minister’s Office on 1st October 1965: “The 
Prime Minister has noted that a few persons in the Chinese Chamber of Commerce… are today 
trying to assume heroic postures on behalf of the Chinese language.” The statement relates the 
“ignominy” of one Mr. Tan Lark Sye, a “one-time great Chinese chauvinist” who under pressure 
from the Malaysian government recanted his views and said that he had always been in favor of 
promoting Malay as the National Language, reminding “those who are thinking of glorifying their 
public image by position as language heroes (sic)… [that they] should consider whether they are 
bigger than Mr. Tan Lark Sye was when he was at the height of his power.”50 As in the case with 
the “Don’t be Shy” advertisement, the state demanded for itself the power to identify and attribute 
the intentions behind the actions of citizens. In that case, the state insisted that a major reason for 
the use of dialect was “shyness”; in this instance, the state insisted that those seeking to promote 
the position of the Chinese language against the Malay language were not, in fact, doing what they 
thought was best for the country or their people, but simply seeking to “glorify their public 
                                                     





50 Kuan Yew, Lee, “Statement from the Prime Minister’s Office on Singapore’s Official Languages” (Statement, Prime 
Minister’s Office, October 1st, 1965), http://a2o.nas.sg/stars/public/viewPDF-body.jsp?pdfno=lky19651001.pdf  
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position” and gain fame and fortune. The statement wrapped up with a cryptic warning of sorts: 
“They should also remember the depths to which Mr. Tan Lark Sye groveled when a country 
chauvinism terrorized him (sic).”51 Although the literal meaning of the sentence is uncertain, it 
seemed that the government was warning would-be “Chinese chauvinists,” as they were called, of 
the potential repercussions of their actions. 
As Rajah states, though, despite the government’s best efforts, conflicts over language (and 
more generally about race) continued to exist. In particular a significant number of Chinese were 
worried about “Chinese” education and the place of Chinese language and culture in the country. 
These issues had become incredibly politicized, in no small part due to the fact that key individuals 
associated with criticizing the government over its policies towards the “Chinese”-language 
university, Nantah (e.g. lack of recognition of Nantah degrees in the civil service), had joined with 
or otherwise supported the Communist Barisan Socialis Party in the 1963 elections. The PAP’s 
leaders, on the other hand, were English-educated, leading to the perception of divisions even if 
the leaders themselves were ethnically Chinese.52 Lee Kuan Yew recalls in his memoirs that “a 
hard core of the Chinese-educated did not welcome what they saw as a move to make English the 
common working language, and expressed unhappiness in Chinese newspapers.” According to 
Lee, he was asked by members of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce to “guarantee the status of 
the Chinese language as one of the official languages in Singapore”, but Lee “scotched this move 
before it could grow into a campaign, for once the Chinese Chamber got going, every Chinese 
school management committee and the two Chinese teachers’ unions would surely work up the 
                                                     
51 Ibid. 
 
52 Jothie Rajah. Authoritarian Rule of Law: Legislation, Discourse and Legitimacy in Singapore (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012): 121 
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ground.”53 This led to the statement of October 1st quoted above. Lee also recalls protests by 
Nantah college graduates and the growing sense of besiegement by the Chinese-educated who 
were confronted with the increasing number of parents who chose to send their children to English 
schools: “They berated those who chose English schools as money-minded and short-sighted.”54 
Curiously enough, the government would make these exact accusations of “Western” culture 
before very long. Lee acknowledges that while “English was the only acceptable neutral 
language… but it did seem to deculturalise our students and make them apathetic.”55 
The reason for having a National Language was elaborated on by Minister for Education 
at the time, Ong Pang Boon: “Malay is… common to all, understood by all, and spoken by all. The 
two-fold role of the National Language is firstly to strengthen the bonds between the various 
communities and secondly to help create a national identity of our own.”56 Contrary to what Ong 
claimed, it was not immediately obvious that the choice of Malay as the National Language would 
have a prompt unifying effect on the people. Indeed sources within the government were well 
aware of the pride which many racial groups took in their language. Ong Soo Chuan, Political 
Secretary to the Ministry of Culture, made a speech on “National Language Month” that same 
month saying  
Malay is our common language for it is a language which is easier to learn. This, our 
decision on official language is based purely on the multi-racial society in which we live 
and there is no racial discrimination whatsoever. Obviously, we are different from other 
countries which make use of language as a political instrument and must arbitrarily fix a 
certain language in a multi-racial society as the only official language so that by means of 
language, they can perpetuate their communalist feudal rule. On the contrary, we in 
                                                     
53 Lee, From Third World to First, 171 
54 Ibid, 172 
55 Ibid, 173 
 
56 Pang Boon, Ong, “Opening of National Language Month Ceremony” (Speech, Government Youth Training Center, November 
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Singapore have adopted an enlightened, practical and appropriate policy with regard to the 
language problem.57  
Several things stand out in this statement. First, the notion that Malay was the common language 
because it was easier to learn – in spite of this claim, the government went on to promote a bilingual 
policy which made all students learn English, making English the main common language (at least 
among the youth). Second, the refusal to recognize the reasoning behind alternate policies in other 
countries – there is Singapore’s “enlightened” way, or there is a power-hungry use of language to 
strengthen a “communalist feudal rule” – is part of what would become a trend of drawing sharp 
parallels between the good (Singapore) and the bad, with the government reserving the right to 
determine the intention behind others’ actions. Third, it is easy to see from this statement that the 
government was keenly aware of the possibility of accusations of bias in selecting the National 
Language (“there is no racial discrimination whatsoever”). The National Language Month, Ong 
said, would pull together a huge program with “more than 600 items,” including “debates, 
oratorical contests, dramatic performances,… national language lessons,… a National Language 
night, a National Language songs night and the Miss National Language contest sponsored by 
Malay Youth Associations… we will prove that language is no longer a political issue in this 
newly-emergent multi-racial country of ours by presenting the fact that the people of Singapore 
take an active part in launching the National Language campaign and are using the common 
language extensively.”58 
                                                     
57 Soo Chuan, Ong “Talk to The Ministry of Culture on National Language Month” (Speech, Ministry of Culture, November 11th, 
1965), http://drm.a2o.nas.sg/DJVUServer/PdfStampServlet?app=stars&filepath=pdfdoc/PressR19651111a.pdf 
58 Ibid. 
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On the whole, despite their attempts to depolitcize language, the PAP continued to face 
stringent opposition from some in the Chinese community, and this would manifest itself in a battle 
over the press in the early 1970s. 
c. The press as a threat to the nation 
“Towards the end of 1970, the major Chinese paper, Nanyang Siang Pau, turned rabidly pro-
Communist and pro-Chinese language and culture. It mounted an attack on the government, 
accusing it of trying to suppress Chinese language, education and culture,” Lee explains in his 
autobiography. “We had to arrest… the general manager …the editor-in-chief …and Ly Singko, 
the senior editorial writer, for glamorizing communism and stirring up chauvinistic sentiments 
over Chinese language and culture.”59 Ly, when asked in an interview to speak about the issue, 
replied (translated): “A Chinese newspaper would naturally place importance on spreading 
Chinese education, since that is its lifeline... If there is no Chinese education and no one 
understands Chinese, who would read a Chinese paper?”60 
That was not how the government saw it. As quoted in a Straits Times report on the arrests, the 
Nanyang had for a long time been opposed to government policies, but the straw that broke the 
camel’s back was one statement in particular: “Having over the weeks depicted the Government 
as oppressors of Chinese education and language, [the Nanyang] went one step further. It branded 
the Government as ‘pseudo-foreigners who forget their ancestors’. This is the battle cry that was 
                                                     
59 Ibid, 172 
60 Original statement: “华文报纸当然注重宣扬华文教育, 因为这是他们的生命线…如果没有华文教育, 没有人懂华文,那还
有谁看华文报?” 
Reference: Singko, Ly. Interview by Lin Xiao Sheng. Tape recording. April 15th, 1987. National Archives of Singapore. Last 
accessed September 10th, 2013. 
http://drm.a2o.nas.sg/DJVUServer/PdfStampServlet?app=cord_data&filepath=772/OHC000772_007.pdf.  
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once used by Malay chauvinists in Singapore against their multi-racial compatriots before the 
island plunged into communal violence. The Government has taken action to prevent these men 
who, under the cover of defending Chinese language and education, are letting loose forces which 
will sharpen conflict along race, language and culture lines.”61 This clearly demonstrates the way 
in which the trauma of racial conflict in the past remained extremely vivid for the government, to 
the point where the final push came arguably not from a substantive change in policy by the paper, 
but by a choice phrase which the government associated with past strife. The phrasing of the 
statement is also intriguing: those at the Nanyang were not participants in dialogue making 
statements that might happen to stir up communal feelings; they were, as portrayed by the 
government, deliberately unleashing racial feeling “under cover of defending Chinese language 
and education.”  
The government’s statement accused the Nanyang of having made a “sustained effort to instill 
admiration for the communist system… while highlighting in the domestic news pages the more 
unsavoury aspects of Singapore life.” The fact that two of those arrested, including Ly, were 
“journalists with a Kuomintang and anti-Communist background” did not serve to exonerate them, 
but rather made their supposed actions “all the more sinister” – in the government’s eyes, 
circumstances which might once have been seen as exonerating now served only to cast further 
doubt on the supposed agenda of those accused. The greatest proof that this was a “deliberate and 
calculated” attempt at political subversion, according to the government, was a comparison 
between the Singaporean and Malaysian editions of the paper. The latter showed “no attempt… to 
play up communist achievements or to stoke communal sentiments over Chinese language and 
                                                     
61 Leslie Fong, “Three newsmen held,” The Straits Times, May 3rd, 1971, 1. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19710503-1.2.2.aspx 
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education. On the contrary, in the Malaysian edition there is general support for that government’s 
education policies… In a deliberate campaign to stir up Chinese racial emotions, the paper sets the 
mood of tension, impending conflict and violence by persistently reminding its readers of the 
violence, turmoil and unrest of the turbulent 1957-59 period of Singapore’s history.”62 Even if the 
government was correct in this, the fact that the statement does not bother addressing the possibility 
that the differing criticism level might be attributable to less objectionable policies in Malaysia 
speaks volumes. To the government, there was no doubt that it was in the right, and its policies 
were “enlightened.” Criticism of it was thus not possible unless those criticizing it had ill intent.’ 
The Nanyang issue attracted a significant degree of international attention, when Lee Kuan 
Yew made an appearance at the General Assembly of the International Press Institute at Helsinki 
in June 1971. In a speech entitled “The Mass Media and New Countries”, Lee undertook a far-
ranging defense of the government’s policies and attitudes towards the press.63 The mass media, 
he said, “can help to present Singapore’s problems simply and clearly and then explain how if [the 
people] support certain programmes and policies these problems can be solved. Most important, 
we want the mass media to reinforce, not to undermine, the cultural values and social attitudes 
being inculcated in our schools and universities.” Reverting to the question of the forces tugging 
at the various racial groups in Singapore and clamoring for their loyalties, Lee expressed his 
concern that the Chinese, for example, might be susceptible to the “archaic values and political 
styles of Taiwan” or even those of the “People’s Republic of China, every product dyed in Maoist 
red.” The Malays were vulnerable to “the mass media from peninsular Malaya and Indonesia” 
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which had “irredentist pulls… reinforced by visits of businessmen and tourists”, while the Indians 
had “Indian publications and films, primarily from South India carrying the pulls at the heartstrings 
of cultural and ethnic loyalties.” Lee explicitly referred back to the 1964 riots, claiming that “a 
sustained campaign in a Malay language newspaper, falsely alleging the suppression of the rights 
of the Malay and Muslim minority by the Chinese majority, led to riots in which 36 people were 
killed and many more injured...” It is interesting to note of this last remark that the supposed 
oppressor is not the PAP government, but the “Chinese majority” as a whole. The statement 
effectively works to cast the government almost as a disinterested and neutral third party, watching 
objectively from the sidelines as the conflict unfolded instead of being an active participant in the 
controversy, and therefore better able to analyze the crisis and its roots and solutions.  
The PAP government’s approach towards the “Western” conception of the press as the fourth 
estate and press freedoms in general seemed to center, at least rhetorically, on two claims. The first 
was the argument that the press could not legitimately claim to represent the views of the public. 
On the first issue, Cheong Yip Seng, once editor-in-chief of The Straits Times, put it in his 
memoirs:  
Lee Kuan Yew would have none of the Western notions of press freedom, for it meant the 
press had the right to be a power centre equal to the government, the judiciary, the legislature 
and the voting public… the question for the Singapore media was this: who voted for you 
that you should be entitled to speak for the voters, or tear down the government’s policies? 
The Singapore journalist did not go through the baptism of fire of a general election, so could 
only claim limited privilege in the debate on national policies… I have not heard an effective 
rebuttal of the PM’s position, from the opposition parties or the intellectual elite.64  
Abdul Wahab Ghows, Solicitor-General from 1971-81 and Supreme Court Judge from 1981-
86, recalled in an interview a Cabinet Meeting at which Lee discussed the role of the press. 
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According to him, Lee said: “The person who represents public opinion is me. I was elected by 
the public. [Millionaires who run newspapers were] not elected by anybody. [They] only [represent 
themselves]. And [they] have the nerve to claim to voice the public opinion and things like that.”65 
In his memoirs, Lee said: “My early experiences in Singapore and Malaya shaped my views about 
the claim of the press to be the defender of the truth and freedom of speech. The freedom of the 
press was the freedom of its owners to advance their personal and class interests.”66 
In a speech made at the Press Club Dinner in 1972, Lee elaborated on the second position 
himself: “The efficacy of the mass media in shaping attitudes and influencing behavior is beyond 
doubt… What amazes me is that this powerful instrument does not require of its practitioners 
special professional training nor codes of conduct to govern them.”67 He argued that the media 
encouraged wrongdoing by imitation, claiming that, for example, the reporting of successful 
hijackings led to the adoption of hijacking as a strategy by others. He informed the attendees that 
their “duty” was to “inform, educate and entertain… inculcate values which will make Singapore 
a more cohesive society, and viable nation.” Cheong recalled the difficulties of working in the 
media at this time, saying: “I would label this period in the 1970s the bare knuckles phase in the 
turbulent history of government-media relations… I recall one meeting… where [Lee Kuan Yew] 
railed at editors because he was exasperated with our lack of political sensitivity. That meant our 
coverage of a government policy had failed, in his view, to understand what was in Singapore’s 
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national interest, usually because we put too much weight on its negative effects. If we wanted a 
fight, he warned, he would use knuckledusters.”68  
The press, moreover, was also seen as a means of defense against external forces. Lee, in the 
Helsinki speech, said that foreign powers such as the Malayan Communist Party often tried to 
shape the opinions of citizens. The government had “the responsibility to neutralize their 
intentions. In such a situation, freedom of the press, freedom of the news media, must be 
subordinated to the overriding needs of the integrity of Singapore, and to the primacy of purpose 
of an elected government.” Tan Siow Sun, who sat on the Appeals Board of the Board of Film 
Censors and was later appointed Registrar of Newspapers, commented: “This was the heydays 
[sic] of communist-China, very self-confident China under Mao Tse-tung. So there were a lot of 
propaganda movies, which during those times we felt should not be shown in public cinemas.”69 
The traditional Western conception of the press as a fourth estate, an essential check and balance 
protecting the people from excesses of government, was effectively reversed by the PAP 
government’s rhetoric, as the government presented a world in which it was the duty of the 
government to protect the people from the press.  
In 1974, the government passed the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act. Among other things, 
the Act demanded that all major shareholders of newspapers be approved by the state.70 Although 
arguably possible to pass off as a response to the problem of foreign ownership of the press, Rajah 
points out that it in fact could not be challenged in court. The only avenue of appeal possible was 
the state, which naturally could not be said to be an objective party. Therefore, only papers which 
                                                     
68 Cheong, OB Markers, 127 
69 Siok Sun, Tan. Interview by Jason Lim. Tape Recording. May 2nd, 2008. Last accessed September 11th 2013. 
http://drm.a2o.nas.sg/DJVUServer/PdfStampServlet?app=cord_data&filepath=2752/OHC002752_001.pdf 
70 Rajah, The Authoritarian Rule of Law, 143 
State of the Arts: Government, National Identity, and the Arts in Singapore 
32 | P a g e  
2013-2014 Penn Humanities Forum Andrew W. Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final 
Paper, May 2014. Shawn Teo, College of Arts and Sciences 2014, University of Pennsylvania.  
 
were ideologically in line with the government could be marketed. This was just one part of the 
government’s extremely actively interventionist role in the press, making not just “security-
related” but business decisions for the press companies in Singapore. Cheong recalls an incident 
in the early 1980s, when the government intervened to force the Nanyang to merge with the Sin 
Chew Jit Poh, its main rival, in part due to the fact that the government believed that competition 
would be “ruinously expensive; both would be forced to invest in new printing presses, a costly 
prospect in a declining market [of readers of Chinese newspapers].”71 Later, when another English-
language newspaper, the Singapore Monitor, faced troubles at launch, “the PM intervened. He had 
a radical idea to get the Monitor off the ground: we were to hand over our sister paper, Business 
Times, lock, stock and barrel.”72 Eventually, the PM demanded that the major newspapers merge 
to form Singapore Press Holdings, which “would own every significant newspaper in Singapore 
in all the official languages except Tamil. It was the final piece of the media architecture Lee Kuan 
Yew had worked hard to bring about.”73 
In 1986, the government amended the Act to “enable the government to cut the circulation of 
any publication it deemed to be ‘engaging in the politics of Singapore’. In effect, ‘engaging in 
politics’ meant refusal to give Singapore the right to put up its version of the news.”74 The new 
law was directed primarily against foreign publications. It was invoked against Time and the Far 
Eastern Economic Review when they fell afoul of the government. Time had refused to carry an 
unedited letter pointing out supposed “factual errors” when the magazine reported on a case 
involving opposition member JB Jeyeratnam in 1986. As a result, the government halved the 
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magazine’s circulation to 9000, with a cut to 2000 scheduled for the following January.75 The 
restriction was lifted in July 1987, one year later, after Time published the letter and appealed to 
have the restriction lifted.76 The Asian Wall Street Journal was the second publication to suffer 
similar restrictions, after allegedly refusing to publish “a reply by the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore to a front-page article in its Dec 12 issue on Singapore’s second stock exchange, known 
as Sesdaq. The MAS letter refutes, among other allegations, the suggestions in the article that the 
Government will use the new exchange to ‘unload’ state-controlled and government-backed 
companies.”77 The Asian Wall Street Journal’s circulation was likewise cut. Soon, Asiaweek and 
the Far Eastern Economic Review suffered similar fates. Lee recounts these episodes in detail in 
his memoirs, concluding with a statement from a speech made to the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors in Washington DC in April 1988: “We cannot allow [the foreign press] to 
assume a role in Singapore that the American media play in America, that is, of [examiner], 
adversary, and inquisitor of the administration.”78 Lee further dismissed criticism, noting that the 
government regularly banned Communist publications, with no objections from the West.79 
Cheong said that “The Straits Times accepted the right of reply principle, assured by the 
government’s concession that it was prepared to accept editing of its replies provided edits did not 
alter their meaning, with all their nuances. We could not see why an aggrieved party should be 
denied his say.”80 
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The threat, however, was not limited to the political accusations posed by foreign media. In 
fact, the government was deeply concerned with what it saw as the possible moral contamination 
which came along with exposure to the “West.” 
d. Tensions with the “West” 
The PAP government was for a long time caught in a love-hate relationship with the “West”, 
broadly defined. On one hand, the “West” was felt to pose an existential moral threat to the very 
fabric of Singaporean society. On the other, the state construed itself explicitly in terms of the 
accepted “Western” definition of a state, and was eager to prove its legitimacy according to the 
usual metrics used by Western commentators to determine the worth of a state. In particular, it was 
concerned with portraying itself as rational, secular, and objective. The meshing of these two 
seemingly contradictory approaches to the West – decrying it while to some extent adopting its 
standards for legitimacy – would create a unique approach towards civil society which would come 
to characterize the government’s relationship with the grassroots and the arts, as already seen to 
some degree in its workings with the press. 
In the first place, the government was very concerned with the threat posed by “Western 
values.” Lee sharply criticized the stream of media coming from the West, arguing that it posed a 
danger to the moral fabric of society. “At best,” he said, “these programmes entertain without 
offending good taste. At worst, they can undo all that is being inculcated in the schools and 
universities… at a time when new nations require their peoples to work hard and be disciplined to 
make progress, their peoples are confused by watching and reading of the happenings in the West. 
They read in newspapers and see on T.V. violent demonstrations in support of peace, urban 
State of the Arts: Government, National Identity, and the Arts in Singapore 
35 | P a g e  
2013-2014 Penn Humanities Forum Andrew W. Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final 
Paper, May 2014. Shawn Teo, College of Arts and Sciences 2014, University of Pennsylvania.  
 
guerrillas, drugs, free love and hippieism.”81 Countries like Singapore, he suggested, ought “cut 
out the sensational and the crude, and screen only the educational, and aesthetic, the scientific and 
technological triumphs of the West.” This statement, of course, contained an implicit definition of 
what constitutes “progress”, with only the “violent” demonstrations in the West being accorded 
any significance, and the more peaceful demonstrations and acts of civil society being ignored 
altogether. In that way the state presented “progress” as mutually exclusive with the greater 
freedoms accorded to citizens in the “West”, since only the negative outcomes of those freedoms 
were acknowledged. It is notable as well that the problems he listed were almost exclusively those 
associated with the actions of civil society, useful for the government’s narrative about the dangers 
of an unfettered civil society free to speak and act on whatever issues may seem to be of greatest 
importance to them. More than that, though, the West was continually portrayed not just as a 
security threat in the traditional sense that overexposure to Western media could cause death and 
suffering directly through violence, demonstrations, and disorder, but as a threat to the moral fabric 
of society.  
In his speech to the Press Club in 1972, Lee criticized a newspaper, the New Nation, for 
“imitating what the Western journalists are doing. It was ostensibly respectable. First, a serious 
study of homosexuality. Then a protracted series of lesbianism. Then unwanted babies. How did 
it come to such a pass? By a gradual, insidious process of suggesting that this is all right, that there 
is nothing wrong with it. It has led to ‘anything and everything goes.’”82 In that same speech, he 
warned the press to avoid “salacious or blue jokes”, also recalling a night program he had seen 
which “had… a girl in a night dress, a married man putting his clothes on and a telephone through 
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which she was talking to all her other lovers.” Lee attributed this “pervasive sense of promiscuity” 
to Western influence, declaring that:  
We have got to fight it. Twenty years ago, you would not see Singapore boys and girls walking 
about arms around each other’s waists. British boys and girls did that. Singaporeans did not. 
Their parents would frown upon it… but, gradually, through the daily exposure, they have 
come to accept this as normal decent behavior. But there are certain norms of public conduct 
which, unless maintained, must affect the whole texture of that society. It is not possible to 
sustain the moral fibre of your society if ‘everything goes’. Everything does not go in 
Singapore... Many a once scandalous conduct has been acceptable. Traditional values are being 
gradually eroded. There is a reason for taboos in society.  
Control of the media was essential to prevent the “input of the pernicious and the vicious and 
prevent our people from over-exposure to what is bad.”83 In his Helsinki speech, he had also 
accused the West of spreading “promiscuity, venereal diseases, exhibitionism and a breakdown of 
the family unit”, expressing his hope that “the pill plus the traditional importance of the Asian 
family unit, where paternity is seldom in doubt, can prevent the excesses from imitating 
contemporary Western sexual mores.”84 S. Rajaratnam, at one point Foreign Minister, also accused 
Western Europe of suffering from social problems as a result of their values and style of 
government, writing in 1987: “I could enumerate the many symptoms of the sickness which today 
afflicts the West – drugs, sexual promiscuity, dropping out, the rash of cults of unreason, and the 
glorification of violence.”85 While there could be much more said about the sexual conservatism 
espoused by the leaders as being a necessary part of the social norms of the country, it is sufficient 
to note that they were very comfortable with making sweeping generalizations about the moralities 
present in the “West.” 
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The role of education was also seen as crucial, as Lee said: “I believe the safest way is cultural 
inoculation, steeped early in our own traditional values… when the children are young, make them 
understand that there are basic traditional values they should hold fast to… this is what we are 
trying to do in the schools through bilingualism.”86 This suggested that there was, to some extent, 
an attempt to appeal to a “usable past” to justify cultural norms. He restated this point in his 
memoirs, recalling how his experience of the political scene in the 1950s shaped this view:  
When I acted as legal adviser for the Chinese middle school student leaders in the 1950s I was 
impressed by their vitality, dynamism, discipline and social and political commitment. By 
contrast, I was dismayed at the apathy, self-centredness and lack of self-confidence of the 
English-educated students… English… did seem to deculturalise our students and make them 
apathetic.87  
He commented on the Chinese school system, saying he:  
wanted to preserve what was good in the Chinese schools: the discipline, self-confidence and 
moral and social values they instilled in their students, based on Chinese traditions, values and 
culture. We had to transmit these same values to students in the new bilingual schools… when 
we use English as the medium of instruction, Confucian values of the family could not be 
reinforced in schools because both teachers and students were multiracial and the textbooks 
were not in Chinese. In addition, the traditional moral values of our students were being eroded 
by increasing exposure to the Western media, interaction with foreign tourists in Singapore and 
their own overseas travel. 
He attributed the rapid spread of “Western” values to the usage of English in Singapore.88 Other 
commenters made similar points – Cheng, an academic writing in 1990, argued for the importance 
of building up a “cultural ballast against the adverse impact of Westernisation”, which would be 
achieved through emphasizing Chinese culture in education: “the traditional core values which are 
manifested in the upholding of the time-tested traditions, systems, and human relationships… As 
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cultural identity is inextricably linked to language, hence the bilingual policy since the mid-1960s 
by which English is a major medium of instruction in schools supplemented by a mother tongue.”89 
On the other, though, the government was extremely concerned with demonstrating publicly 
that it met, to some extent, “Western” standards of good governance. Lee’s appearances at Helsinki 
and Washington DC, for example, was an implicit recognition of the importance of those 
international press institutions and showed a desire on the part of the government to clear its name 
in a public forum and to be perceived as “legitimate” in the eyes of the world. To that end, the 
troubles of race and religion, supposedly unique to Singapore’s situation, were continually invoked 
and emphasized. These claims were not easily (or perhaps at all) challengeable by those present, 
as compared to, say, the claims of foreign subversion, for which much more substantive evidence 
could be demanded.90 Indeed, as Rajah phrases it, the state continually “engaged in a highly visible 
process by which it demonstrated its rational, ‘rule of law’ identity.”91 Examples of this include 
the ways in which the government confronted the Law Society publicly, with Rajah noting that the 
primary concern of the state (and the reason for its anger at the public criticism of policies put out 
by the Law Society) was the fact that it felt that it was of utmost importance that the government 
be “perceived and presented, in the public domain, as unquestionably and unfailingly ‘right’.”92 In 
her book, Rajah provides many more examples and conducts a much more thorough analysis of 
how exactly “law” became a “performance” to demonstrate the legitimacy of the government.  
It is interesting, then, to note the claims of some other scholars on the relationship of national 
identity to government policy. Stephan Ortmann, for instance, argued that Singapore did not (and 
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does not) have a national identity, due to an emphasis on a “rational sense of cost benefit analysis 
instead of an emotional attachment to cultural values.”93 John Clammer similarly identified an 
“endemic elitism” in Singapore society94 as well as a “love of technological solutions, surveys, 
statistics and ‘management’… [which] is actually an indicator of… the devaluation of the 
human.”95 The problem with these claims is threefold.  
First, no explanation is given as to why, for example, a “rational sense of cost benefit analysis” 
could not constitute a type of national identity or ideology. There has, of course, been much debate 
over what constitutes a national identity. The work of scholars such as Brubaker is instructive in 
de-aggregating the multiple meanings usually associated with the word “identity” – he offers five 
separate ways in which the word is commonly used, among them: “a fundamental similarity 
between members of a certain category (either objectively or subjectively)”; “the presence of a 
deep and abiding condition of being as opposed to that which is superficial or fleeting, and which 
is to be cultivated and preserved”; and “a product of social and political action, the processual, 
interactive development of the kind of collective self-understanding... that can make collective 
action possible” 96. The implication of Ortmann’s statement, in the way in which he argues that 
identity does not exist because of a lack of emphasis on “cultural values,” implies that an emphasis 
on rationality cannot be a “deep and abiding condition” and must be “superficial and fleeting,” an 
assumption which is at best unjustified. Why can an emphasis on rationality, for example, not be 
a cultural value in itself? A false dichotomy is drawn which is not adequately substantiated. Indeed, 
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the second problem we can identify with the type of claims exemplified by the two given above is 
their factual inaccuracy. As just demonstrated in this past chapter, at least in the rhetoric of the 
government, Singapore did maintain a strong attachment to certain cultural values (importance of 
the traditional family unit, importance of political stability etc.) and a resentment of other values 
(sexual promiscuity, “hippieism” etc.).  
The third, and perhaps largest, problem with the claims is the inherent assumption that an 
emphasis on “technological solutions, surveys, statistics, and ‘management’” must necessarily fail 
to be cohesive (in Brubaker’s terms, that which “makes collective action possible”). In fact, it 
might be that the exact opposite is true. The thrust of this chapter has been to show the main 
concerns plaguing the Singaporean government in the immediate post-independence years. One of 
the most severe, if not the most severe, threats which it was believed faced the nation was the 
problem of the centrifugal forces of race and religion which it was thought might tear the new 
nation apart if left unchecked. It is precisely those forces which a state ideology emphasizing the 
supposedly objective nature of government was best suited to keep in check. If the government, 
which was and is majority Chinese, promoted policies that ended up leading to a significant 
difference in the income levels of various racial groups, for instance, it would have been all too 
easy for members of the opposition, subversives etc. to accuse the government of bias, leading to 
anger and resentment – unless the government was able to use precisely that emphasis on the 
technical and statistical to cast itself as an objective, unbiased party. In that way it was not so much 
the “devaluation of the human” which occurred, but rather the sense of detachment granted by 
these “values” – an emphasis on the figures associated with economic growth, the apotheosis of 
“law” as objective and unbiased, and the championing of numbers and statistics as technical and 
therefore impartial – which could be seen as having played a role in preserving the cohesiveness 
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of the state. Of course, this did create a nascent tension in the state, as it tried to balance its rejection 
of “Western” values on one hand with its appeal to metrics commonly promoted by the “West” as 
legitimizing a state on the other. It was in order to preserve their narrative, as touched on earlier, 
that the state could not abide public criticism, for such public criticism might have cast doubt on 
the image of the government as an objective body capable of implementing policy fairly and in an 
impartial manner.  
Under this mindset, the government refused responsibility (real or imagined) for problems such 
as inequality. Instead, the responsibility was shifted to other parties, and the government cast itself 
as not just an objective outsider, but the best possible source of solutions to the problem. A prime 
example of this would be in the “government’s acceptance and promotion of the orthodox 
explanation of Malay economic backwardness in terms of their cultural values” when confronted 
with the phenomenon of economic inequality among the races.97 In 1980, for instance, the Malays 
(comprising about 15% of the population) had the lowest percentage of persons aged ten years and 
above with secondary and higher level education (13.7% as compared to the 20.8% nationally), 
performance in national exams was below that of non-Malay students, and in 1980 they constituted 
only “8 per cent of the total professional and technical work force, 2 per cent of all administrative 
personnel including managers, and 4 per cent of the total number of sales workers in Singapore.”98 
The government, according to Brown (quoted in Hill and Lian), “promoted the acceptance among 
the Malays of the ‘Malay cultural-weakness orthodoxy’, whereby the Malays are persuaded to see 
their own internal attributes as responsible for their socio-economic problems, instead of blaming 
                                                     
97 Michael Hill and Kwen Fee, Lian. The Politics of Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore. (New York: Routledge Books, 
1995): 169  
98 Zoohri, Wan Hussin. Socio-Economic Problems of the Malays in Singapore. Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast 
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the Chinese or the government. It is the lack of achievement motivation, or the rural orientation of 
Malays, which is, in this view, the cause of their ‘predicament’.”99 It is easy to see how a belief 
that the government was responsible for the undesirable reality of the low socioeconomic status of 
Malays could easily have lead to resentment or anger. With the promotion of the “Malay cultural 
weakness orthodoxy,” however, the government portrayed itself as objective, and the implementer 
of policies designed to rectify the problem, primarily by radically re-orienting the value systems 
of the Malay communities. It did this in collaboration with “Malay middle-class mediators” and 
the establishment of organizations like The Council on Education of Muslim Children (Mendaki) 
in 1981 by Malay PAP MPs who wanted to improve the poor performance of Malays in education 
and employment.100 In a 1982 address at the opening ceremony of the Congress of Mendaki, Lee 
Kuan Yew encouraged Mendaki to “strive to make the striving for success through scholarship 
universally accepted and admired as a virtue… the attitudes of Chinese and Indian parents to 
learning as the road to progress are the result of historical experience.”101 At the same time, the 
government worked to distance itself somewhat from the organization to maintain its image of 
objectivity, for example, a news article was run in March 1983 for the sole purpose of quoting 
Acting Social Affairs Minister Ahamd Mattar as saying that “Mendaki was not an organ of the 
ministry, but a voluntary effort on the part of the Muslim community. Therefore, Mendaki could 
not be an organ of the government.”102  
                                                     
99 Hill and Lian, The Politics of Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore, 169. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Kuan Yew, Lee, “Address at Opening Ceremony of the Congress of the Council on Education for Muslim Children” (Speech, 
Singapore Conference Hall, May 28th, 1982) 
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102 Editors, “Mendaki is set up by willing Muslims,” The Straits Times, March 24th, 1983, 8. 
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There is much more to the discussion of the attitude towards the “culture” of the Malay 
community in Singapore, but for the purposes of this thesis it is sufficient to note the salient 
features identified in the government’s policies: above all, the recognition that any perception of 
the government as biased might endanger the social fabric of the country. Hence, the government 
took great pains to depict itself as unbiased, objective, and technocratic, in an echo of Western 
conceptions of state “legitimacy.” The dichotomy was further compounded by the fact that the 
government’s appeals to “traditional values” as a bulwark against “Western decadence” drew 
almost entirely on Chinese traditions and its understanding of Confucianism. This was 
uncomfortable territory; the PAP was well aware that too much emphasis on Chinese values might 
cause racial frictions. Therefore, the Singapore government found itself walking a tightrope. On 
one hand it implicitly accepted many of the standards of the “West” for demonstrating the 
legitimacy of the government, not just to the international audience but to the electorate as well. 
On the other, though, it remained fearful of the possibility that, left unchecked, the influence of 
the West would cause moral degradation which would shred the social fabric of the new country. 
Naturally, the main methods through which such “values” could be spread were forms of arts – 
and the unique concerns and style of the government, as explored in this chapter, would come to 
shape the Singapore government’s approach towards the arts scene.  
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Chapter Two  
In 1968, Lee Kuan Yew told a university audience: “Poetry is a luxury we cannot afford,” 
in what has become an (in)famous expression which scholars have used to point to the fact that 
Singapore was (and remains) a “cultural desert.”103 This is a term which even the PAP itself had 
come to accept as an apt description of the state of Singapore’s “cultural” scene in the decades just 
after independence.  
Was this true? Was Singapore a “cultural desert?” The English newspapers seem to provide 
support for this. “Unlike the Chinese dailies” (which, as mentioned in the previous chapter, were 
suspect because of what the government saw as their chauvinistic approach to promoting Chinese 
culture), “none of the [English] newspapers publishe[d] a regular literary supplement. 
Singaporeans seriously interested in what literature [was] being published in the East and West 
[had to] go to the imported international magazines and it [was] also in these that one might find 
special surveys of current writing in English from both Singapore and Malaysia.”104 Indeed, L. 
Wee refers to the PAP’s “reputation for forging an uncreative society composed mainly of 
shopping centers by and large stemmed from a pragmatic, petit-bourgeois vision of a hard-working 
modern society”, and later to a “pragmatic, philistine modernity promoted by the government” 
which led to a “mercantile/industrial-oriented indifference to the artsy-craftsy.”105 All that seems 
to agree with the view that Singapore did suffer from a lack of “culture”. 
John Clammer, however, rightly identifies the dichotomy between two definitions of 
“culture” used in Singapore – “high culture”, which is the “government-inspired” definition, 
                                                     
103 C.J.W.-L., Wee “Forming an Asian Modern: Capitalist Modernity, Culture, “East Asia” and Post-Colonial Singapore,” TDR, 
5 (2004): 14. 
104 Tai Ann, Koh. “The Singapore Experience: Cultural Development in the Global Village.” Southeast Asian Affairs (1980): 305 
105 C.J.W. –L., Wee “Creating High Culture in the Globalized ‘Cultural Desert’ of Singapore.” TDR, Vol. 47, No. 4 (2003): 85 
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referred to art forms typically seen as representative of sophistication and wealth, such as ballet, 
orchestral music, operas, and so on. The second, “everyday or anthropological” definition is 
expansive enough to include things like the oral traditions, vernacular drama, traditional music etc. 
of various groups, often racially defined (e.g. Chinese opera, Indian music).106 While the first 
might have been lacking, the latter was not in short supply. Thirunalan Sasitharan, a well-known 
actor and performer in the Singapore arts scene who later went on to become a theatre and visual 
art critic with the Straits Times, a teacher of Philosophy at the National University of Singapore, 
and most recently the co-founder and director of the Intercultural Theatre Institute,107 said in an 
interview, when asked about Singapore’s “cultural deficit”:  
I think that’s completely nonsense. It’s a whole load of rubbish. It’s kind of an imperialistic 
perspective of what constitutes culture – culture is an auxiliary of a ruling elite, or politics, 
an imperium… we’ve had theatre, oral histories and so on – our understanding of our own 
culture, even news. Things back in China and India and so on got transmitted in writing 
and theatres. In the 1920s we had Cantonese opera performances and performances in 
Hindu temples, all of which were about harking back to the homeland, and these weren’t 
imperialistic cultural products. They did not have ‘literary form’. We are much more 
affected by the oral traditions of the past. Many people living in Singapore, e.g. the coolies 
[physical laborers], did not know how to write. We weren’t a literary culture.108 
 
In this view, the argument that Singapore suffered from a “cultural deficit” stemmed from, as in 
Clammer, a particular definition of “culture” which failed to consider the multifarious extant 
artforms and traditions already present in Singapore at that time. 
Not all arts and culture were centered on the old and traditional, though. Sivanandan Choy, 
who became a major figure in the local music scene (playing rock and roll) in the 1980s, discussed 
                                                     
106 John Clammer. Race and State in Independent Singapore 1965-1990 (Suffolk: The Ipswich Book Company, 1998): 63 
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108 Thirunalan Sasitharan. Interview by Shawn Teo. Digital recording. Intercultural Theater Institute. June 26th, 2013.    
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in an interview the lively and exciting performances by well-known international bands in 
Singapore in the 1960s: “At that time in the ‘60s the music of Cliff Richards and The Shadows 
was very big… the Shadows… became popular because they visited Singapore and performed, 
and all of us in secondary school went to see them. We were very impressed… they performed at 
the Gay World Stadium, and everybody wanted to play like them, and they became a very 
influential band.” Singapore also had a well-developed local music scene. He recalled that “in the 
‘60s when we just started, music everywhere in Southeast Asia except the Philippines, musicians 
in Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, even Sri Lanka… would look to Singapore to set the trends. 
Bands from Singapore were dominating Hong Kong, Malaysia.” Soon, though, it all went wrong. 
Choy continued his story: “And then the whole scene just collapsed. And today when I go 
back to Singapore and listen to the jazz scene, and when I go up to Kuala Lumpur [in Malaysia], 
theirs is so far ahead of ours… they’ve all developed this incredible thing, and we lost it.” 109 
Writers themselves in the early to mid-1980s referred to a “paucity of writers in the country” and 
an “unenergetic, subdued, literary scene.”110 What we see, therefore, is a portrait of a country with 
rich and varied cultural and artistic traditions, which suddenly appeared to have lost its vitality. 
How did this come to pass? How did a cultural scene with such vibrancy and life, according to 
some of its most famous practitioners, fall apart, and turn into a “cultural desert”? Was it simply a 
matter of neglect, or something more? The answer to that lies in the statement made by Lee: that 
poetry, and by implication other forms of the arts, were things that Singapore could not “afford”. 
What did he mean by that?  
                                                     
109 Sivanandan Choy. Interview. Tape Recording. National Archives of Singapore.  
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There are at least two ways in which this statement could be read. On one hand, it could be 
read literally – that arts and culture was something that Singapore economically could not “afford”, 
either because it was expensive, or (more likely) because it was considered distracting from the 
main goals of the nation-state. Alternatively, as was discussed in the previous chapter, art could 
have been seen as a major potential threat to the security of Singapore. Each of these possibilities 
will be discussed in turn. 
a. Economics and the cost of the arts 
In his 2010 speech, ex-Prime Minister Goh said that “up till the early 1980s, we focused mainly 
on achieving economic growth and raising per capita income,” resulting in the characterization of 
Singapore as a “cultural desert”.111 To some extent, the stunted growth of the arts scene was due 
to neglect. The government conceived of economic growth and culture as mutually exclusive, at 
least to the extent that pursuing development of “culture” entailed an unacceptable opportunity 
cost.  
Every year, on the occasion of National Day (9th August, marking independence), the Prime 
Minister would make a speech which would be broadcast through the mass media. Known first as 
the National Day Broadcast, then the National Day Message, and eventually as the National Day 
Rally Speech, the speech often discussed what leaders felt were the most significant developments 
of the past year, challenges ahead, and also often contained rhetoric exhorting citizens to be united 
and to avoid strife and conflict. It is remarkable, then, that not a single National Day speech from 
1968 to 1983 contained a single mention of the arts. Instead, every message read similarly, in an 
almost formulaic way, focusing almost entirely on discussion of economic problems and 
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opportunities. Social issues such as strikes were only discussed insofar as the clampdown on 
strikes, portrayed as a “willing[ness] to put in intense and sustained effort” and a desire to become 
“keener and more productive” among workers, was able to contribute to economic growth.112 After 
that would come a deluge of statistics and tables, including “estimates of gross domestic 
expenditure and per capita income”, “external trade statistics”, tables detailing growth (both in 
terms of employment and output) of specific types of industries such as construction and 
manufacturing, tax revenues, and so on. Occasionally, there was a statement emphasizing the 
importance of and pride in the military and defense forces.113 Not once, though, was there any 
reference to the arts.  
Even at that time, this fact was recognized and criticized by many – the government was well 
aware of its deliberate negligence of the arts in these messages. Not only did it not change, it struck 
back vehemently against its critics. In a speech in the Singapore Parliament during a debate over 
the Budget on 5th March 1980, the Member of Parliament for Anson, Devan Nair (who would be 
elected the third President of Singapore in the following year) railed against the “snooty arty-crafty 
types, who denounce materialism and materialists.” He singled out the critics of the style of 
speech-making by the PAP for attack. He quoted a “senior lecturer in the [University of 
Singapore’s] Department of English”, who had apparently said that Singapore “must be about the 
only country where the Prime Minister releases a sat (sic) of tables with his text… Every National 
Day speech contains productivity figures and projections of trade figures, GNP, and so on.” Nair 
called this “mindless gibberish”, saying: 
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This is the kind of intellectual food served to our students in the arts and humanities 
departments. So what does this mean? We tell the Prime Minister, ‘Please, Mr. Prime 
Minister, in your next National Day speech, leave out facts, figures, and statistics.’ Use the 
expressive power of the English language, in the way some of the Presidents and Prime 
Ministers of broken-back societies elsewhere use their own languages, to treat their people 
to hock, platitudes, political chants – anything else but the truth, the hard facts about the 
state of the economy… and our Minister for Finance! When you present next year’s Budget 
don’t you dare use statistics! Present your Budget in English verse, with appropriate rhyme 
and metre. Otherwise, the poor chaps in the English Department would not be able to 
understand you… I for one would not want him to present his next Budget in poetical form. 
I want my facts, figures and statistics. 
Defending Singapore’s focus on economic growth, he went so far as to propose: 
“Singaporeans ought to know… that if we throw our Government Front benchers, our Back 
benchers, our top civil servants, our technocrats, systems engineers, entrepreneurs, skilled workers 
and managers into the ocean, there will not be any Singapore. But throw these arty-crafty reality-
dodgers into the ocean, and you might get a bit more literary and spiritual realism.” The speech as 
a whole reads fairly shockingly, especially compared to the relatively dispassionate speech which 
follows (on the emphasis on “computer services” in the budget), with Nair at times describing 
critics of materialism as engaging in “nincompoopery”, and (some) Singaporean poets as 
“confidence tricksters… apes of style, barren of substance, and devoid of sincerity”, writing 
“depraved” and “execrable stuff.” 114 
Nair’s speech is richly telling of the attitude taken by the government towards the arts, right 
or wrong. Indeed Lee’s statement about poetry being a “luxury” was made when contrasting it to 
“technical education”, which was seen as “more important.”115 Lee further reinforced this concept 
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that literature, in particular, was an optional thing, a “luxury” unnecessary for culture and 
civilisation. In 1978, at a question-and-answer session held at the Malay Teachers’ Union on 
“Educational Challenges in the 1980s”, Lee argued that: 
Literature and heritage or tradition are different altogether… literature is a pastime for 
people who have education… but what is important for pupils is not literature but a 
philosophy of life… this is an important matter which is concerned not with poetry or 
literature but with relationships – the relationship between the younger generation and the 
older generation, the relationship between brothers and sisters, and between friends… this 
is the meaning of culture.116 
Apart from the possibility that a significant amount of literature concerns itself with precisely the 
question of human relationships, and the fact that literary tradition and heritage is a significant part 
of most cultures, literature in particular is once again painted as a “pastime” and a “luxury” for 
those who can afford it, something completely separate from “culture” as a whole. The government 
could therefore take a stance against what it viewed as the extraneous and unnecessary, without 
having to confront or acknowledge accusations of de-emphasizing “culture.” Overall, the arts were 
often seen as (at best) a distraction from the more important job of improving the country’s 
economy and enhancing economic growth.  
b. The arts as morally contaminating 
More than that, however, the government’s attitude towards the arts was not simply one of 
neglect. In fact, the government actively saw the arts as a threat to the security of the state which 
had to be contained. The discursive elements of speeches and policies in particular demonstrate 
the means through which the government attempted to contain these problems. The language used 
by Nair exemplifies the way in which the government had placed itself in a position asserting 
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superior knowledge of the arts, therefore appropriating for itself the right to determine the value 
of artistic endeavors by Singaporean artists. Not only did he refer degradingly to the specific 
artistic content (or lack thereof) in these works of art, literature etc., by stating that they were 
“barren of substance”, “apes of style” etc., but also said: 
Who in Singapore is against Western culture or English culture…? The present generation 
of leaders are persons reared, among other things, on English literature. Indeed, some of 
the values we cherish and admire are British values, which seem to be going out of fashion 
in Great Britain itself… Our Deputy Prime Minister, for instance, has drunk deep of Plato, 
Aristotle and the classics… I have heard our Prime Minister discuss the development of 
Shakespeare’s dramas over lunch. Our Foreign Minister, as everyone knows, is a walking 
library. Rumor has it that even his toilet is a mini-library! And I will take a dim view of 
anybody who thinks poorly of Dostoevsky, Marvell or Wordsworth. So… do not try to 
give the misleading impression to our students that those who sit on the Front and Back-
benches of this House are a bunch of cultural and literary morons. What we do object to is 
not Western culture and civilization, or English culture and literature, but the yellow pop 
culture and the cheap literature churned out by the pulp mills of the West. Not only of the 
West, we also get pop mandarin and pop culture through Taipeh (sic) and Hong Kong. If 
we were against English culture and literature, our senior lecturer in the English 
Department would not have a job, for there would be no English Department.117 
 
The assertion of the superior knowledge and understanding possessed by government 
members was completely in line with its general approach to civil society, characterized by 
continuous assertion of its more in-depth knowledge and understanding of the subject at hand, and 
therefore that it was better placed to make decisions on these subjects. If decisions were seen as 
questionable by others, that was because they did not have the requisite knowledge of the issue, 
and if they did, they would ostensibly agree with the government’s position. For example, when 
the Law Society criticized the government’s handling of the press, the government rebutted the 
Society fiercely. Lee continuously delineated certain laws as “outside the expertise of the Law 
                                                     
117 Nair, C.V.D. (1980). 
State of the Arts: Government, National Identity, and the Arts in Singapore 
52 | P a g e  
2013-2014 Penn Humanities Forum Andrew W. Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final 
Paper, May 2014. Shawn Teo, College of Arts and Sciences 2014, University of Pennsylvania.  
 
Society”, ensuring that “the public was not to think that the Council, as lawyers, had the requisite 
professional knowledge or expertise” to discuss a law pertaining to the press.118  
Nair’s statement also reveals the government’s confidence in its ability to distinguish 
Western “culture and civilization” from “yellow pop culture” and “cheap literature,” in the same 
vein as distinctions between “high culture” and “everyday culture” – except this time, the latter 
was presented not as “everyday culture,” but the very opposite of culture, being rude, dirty, and 
degrading. This stance, again, presupposed not only a factual distinction between Western “culture 
and civilization” and “yellow pop culture” – an assumption laden with implicit statements about 
the very nature of art itself – but that the PAP was the best candidate to distinguish between the 
two. It was this latter sort of art, “yellow” culture, which was seen as a moral danger to society, 
while that which was “old” and “accepted” was valorized and canonized into a hallowed tradition 
apotheosizing (apparent) sophistication and established heritage in dichotomous opposition to the 
new, “trashy”, or simply experimental. Among the cultural forms which were subject to this 
treatment were music and other forms of behavior which were seen to be representative of 
undesirable lifestyles and values. Ultimately the arts were seen as inseparable from the values they 
supposedly encouraged and advocated: traditional culture was desirable because it strengthened 
traditional values and morals, whereas “yellow” culture was undesirable because it led to drug 
abuse and other perceived social problems. 
Commenting on the meaning of the term “yellow culture”, Tan Siok Sun (Appeals Board 
of the Board of Film Censors, later Registrar of Newspapers) said:  
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In those days, yellow culture was a bit synonymous with undesirable themes coming 
from the west, rather than from the east. 1971 we were approaching the hippie days… 
you also associate with drugs, with cannabis and then LSD and later on hard drugs… and 
these crept into music. For example, the Beatles song ‘Lucy in the Sky with Diamonds’ is 
supposed to be extolling the virtues of LSD… so therefore the LP would be banned even 
if all the other songs are fine… ‘Yellow Submarine’ was supposed to be a capsule or 
something. The whole LP would be disallowed… we had to look at books, magazines 
[and] posters… music… television… we actually also (sic) vet the costume [of dancers], 
and they would perform before us… 
 
In stark contrast to Nair’s statements, Tan posited that it was not the place of the government to 
determine the artistic worth of works of art or literature. Recalling a discussion with the Permanent 
Secretary for the Ministry about the book The Last Tango in Paris, when the Permanent Secretary 
said “there is not one iota of artistic merit in this book”, she says:  
I thought that was a strange comment because we are not there to decide whether there is 
artistic merit or not. We are not English literature experts. It is a question of who would 
most likely be reading it. Would it be harmful, does it have any benefits? Is it literature 
[or], as opposed to our guidelines, exploitation.119 
On one level, there is an obvious disagreement with Nair, who said that the government, at 
least at the highest levels, was indeed composed of people who (mostly) were experts in English 
literature and were therefore qualified to pass judgment on the works of, for instance, professors 
of English in the University. On another, though, the inherent assumption in Tan’s statement 
otherwise supports what Nair said, sometimes in ways which appear contradictory. First, she stated 
that it was not the job of the government to determine “artistic merit,” but then said that the 
government had to decide if something was “literature” or “exploitation,” an odd dichotomy to 
draw, and one which still placed the government in the role of the only actor with the knowledge 
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and ability to decide what constituted art. By calling it “exploitation,” the people were portrayed 
as victims with minimal agency, instead of free agents who were rational enough to decide if they 
would like to read a “racy” text. The government cast itself not as a censor, but as a protector 
defending the innocence of citizens from those who would seek to “exploit” it. Furthermore, by 
opposing the terms “literature” and “exploitation,” the government removed a dilemma for itself 
– since the works it censored were “exploitative,” they could not be “literary,” and no one could 
accuse the PAP of being narrow-minded, bigoted, or biased against English “literature,” since all 
books banned were by definition not “literature.” 
As Kong puts it, music in particular became the focus of the creation of “moral panics” by 
the state. As she defined them, moral panics were cases where things or people “become defined 
as a threat to societal values and interests”, often being depicted “in a stylized and stereotypical 
fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and 
other right-thinking people.”120 In 1970, the government enacted a ban on 13 records from the 
Beatles and other popular artists:121 
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As can be seen from the article which ran in the Straits Times, the government clamped 
down hard on music which they claimed “sing the praises of drugs and hippies.” Curiously enough, 
the last statement from the government in the above article seemed to recognize that meaning could 
have been “assumed” by a song (or, perhaps, art form) by the way society read and treated it; 
nevertheless the very first paragraph stated as a fact that these songs were made in support of this 
lifestyle. These were deeply contradictory claims with vast epistemological ramifications for the 
nature and value of art that were never reconciled. 
The bans were implemented not just on import and ownership of the records, but, as the 
article above shows, on the broadcasting of such songs over the radio. Those working at radio 
stations did not see it as a simple act of “urging,” though; to them, the government’s approach was 
heavy-handed and opaque. Mike Ellery, who worked in the radio industry, said: “The first 
indication we got that something was seriously wrong was one Friday122 when we received a letter 
from the Ministry of Culture, saying: ‘On receipt of this letter, you will cease to broadcast the type 
                                                     
122 Unfortunately, Ellery did not specify the date on which this took place. 
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of music known as rock and roll’. That was it.” When asked about the rationale for the ban, Ellery 
recalled that it was:  
…because it was evil, induced drug-smoking and rape and… everything else you could 
think of. It was mostly drugs they were worried about, actually… first thing I did of course 
was to go through my long box of records in the studio and quickly whip out any song that 
had a beat, because if it has a good beat someone’s gonna say it’s rock and roll… I got the 
library staff from Monday to go through every damn record in the library. We didn’t zap 
them… because we thought they would change the law at some time… We marked them 
yellow around the centerpiece. There’s a label round the center, we wrote ‘banned’…123 
 
Choy, the musician, stated: 
[The government was] giving us a hard time every time we walked the streets, cops were 
stopping us because of our long hair. Everyone was so anti-Beatles, the Beatles weren’t 
allowed to come here to perform, they banned all the rock concerts after the Rolling 
Stones… the Rolling Stones was the last concert. There was some misbehavior, some idiots 
jumped on cars and misbehaved… and they just banned them. The blanket reaction to 
everything is ban, ban, ban… we had a big drug problem which was attributed to bands 
and nightclubs… this inability to see that drug problems are a social problem, not just 
people wanting to listen to music…124 
 
The ban was also extended to live performances of bands seen to be playing undesirable 
styles of music, local and international. Nightclubs in particular were associated strongly with this 
type of music, and with drugs and undesirable lifestyles in general. In 1971 entertainment taxes on 
nightclubs and restaurants with live bands were raised by between 100 to 400 per cent, depending 
on whether or not they had a cover charge, making it much harder to sustain live music 
performances.125 
                                                     
123 Mike Ellery. Interview. Tape Recording. National Archives of Singapore. 
124 Sivanandan Choy. Interview. Tape Recording. National Archives of Singapore. 
125 “Higher tax soon on the night clubs,” The Straits Times, May 13th, 1971. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19710513-1.2.51.aspx 
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Unlike Nair’s excoriation of artists for creating art devoid of artistic value, this clampdown 
was because certain art forms were, as mentioned before, associated strongly (or even causally) 
with undesirable behaviors, in this case, drug-taking. Practitioners of the arts also drew a strong 
link between the personalities involved in government and their actions, refusing to accept the 
disinterested, objective self-portrait of government. The personalities of ministers and 
policymakers became a focus for criticism. Their actions, even those before independence, were 
taken as evidence of the personal bias of policymakers. Choy recalls: 
I remember when, in 1959, when S. Rajaratnam became the first Minister for Culture, he 
was totally against rock and roll… he hated rock and roll, I think… there was a clampdown 
on Elvis Presley movies, they were taken off the air… They all came under the 
classification – his classification – of ‘yellow culture’, I don’t know why… the reason was 
that this was contributing to gangsters, juvenile delinquency, and a slavish imitation of the 
West. I recall one incident which upset me considerably, and I haven’t forgotten, was when 
we were asked, as schoolboys, to perform in a… cultural concert… we were schoolboys 
and were happy to play anywhere somebody asked us, and very honored… especially when 
he said the Minister of Culture would be there… as we performed, we looked into the 
audience. He was watching us, but there was a total blank look on his face, as if he was 
totally uninterested in what we were doing. Later, backstage, when he… [met] all the 
artistes… he shook the hands of all the Chinese, Indian, Malay artistes, but when he got to 
us, he looked me straight in the face, did not put out his hand, and went on. I had a distinct 
feeling that he thought we were slavish imitators of Western culture… it was such a snub. 
Years later, I remember thinking: maybe that is your attitude on culture. As a minister, you 
can take such a position, but you also have to remember that these are two little boys who 
are just singing a song, and you are their minister, no matter what, you should shake their 
hands and make them feel good… I think that maybe that incident really affected me 
considerably. I was not able to take anything he did seriously after that.126 
 
Discussing this episode, Rajaratnam’s biographer explains that “Raja was being attacked 
in the Legislative Assembly by [a] PAP breakaway group [composed of Chinese conservatives] 
for promoting Western culture and undermining the morals of the youth… the opposition’s 
                                                     
126 Ibid. 
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populist cries against Western influence were an undeniable constraint on Raja’s actions.” The 
biography also notes that Rajaratnam, after retirement, “disclosed that he was unimpressed by the 
demands of some Chinese-educated politicians to clamp down on ‘so-called yellow culture’… ‘I 
was liberal about what they considered yellow culture.’” In a 1961 report on the ‘anti-yellow 
culture campaign’ co-chaired by Rajaratnam, it was made clear that “what may be immoral and 
undesirable to one group of people may not be so to others… the test lies in the intention behind 
the film, book or play. We should not impose on the community the particular prejudice or feelings 
of prudery of individuals.”127 
Although the rock and roll ban was “eased off” within the next “three, four, five years”128, 
the impression left on performers like Choy was deep. Some, like Choy and Ellery, took particular 
umbrage at the government’s claim to superior knowledge. For them, Rajaratnam and his 
colleagues could offer no possible defense of their position. Ellery commented: “Who’s to say 
what [rock and roll] is? Rajaratnam knows what is rock and roll? Like hell.”129 Choy stated at 
length his belief in the lack of understanding present in people like Rajaratnam who determined 
cultural policy:  
“We failed miserably at culture, because we put people in charge of culture who didn’t 
understand what culture was. I would like to see somebody who paints, who is an artist, 
who is a writer, musician, a dancer… I would like to see somebody like that as Minister of 
Culture, not somebody who hasn’t written a poem, who can’t paint, who doesn’t 
understand music… even if you listen to classical music, that’s fine, but you don’t even do 
that. So what gives you the right to become Minister of Culture?” 
Not only was the government’s veneer of superior knowledge in doubt, so too was its 
position of objectivity. While Nair had claimed that nobody was against any sort of “culture”, 
                                                     
127 Ng, Irene. The Singapore Lion: A Biography of S. Rajaratnam (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010): 350-351 
128 Ellery, Mike. Interview. Tape Recording. National Archives of Singapore. 
129 Ibid. 
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Choy perceived a great deal of inequality of treatment: “I felt that the Chinese musicians didn’t 
have a problem. No one was saying ‘that’s decadent’, ‘this is wrong’… nothing! They could do 
everything. We were the ones playing Western music, and we copped it all the way.”130 The second 
part of the identity the government had tried to create – that of an unbiased, objective body – was 
therefore also at risk.  
In the meantime, the government had extended its definition of the signifiers of moral 
decay to include other aspects of peoples’ behavior, and even appearance. In September 1970 the 
Member of Parliament for Tiong Bahru, Chng Jit Koon, called for the “wiping out of certain 
decadent aspects of Western culture”, in particular “keeping long hair, wearing strange clothes, 
and taking drugs”, which he claimed would harm the individuals concerned and “eventually also 
cause damage to our society.”131 The Parliamentary Secretary for Education reprimanded parents 
for being overly indulgent and allowing “hippism” in their children, blaming them for failing to 
prevent their children from taking up “practices such as sporting long hair, smoking marijuana, 
taking drugs and wearing outlandish clothes” which he claimed were “alien to the Asian way of 
life.”132 It is interesting to note that the phenomenon of long hair and its link to crime and hippie 
lifestyles was linked almost exclusively to boys and men, and also to the youth. The act of leaving 
one’s hair long was presented as necessarily coming into conflict with that which was established 
and old – tradition, heritage, culture etc. Efforts were made in the press to link long hair with 
                                                     
130 Choy, Sivanandan. Interview. Tape Recording. National Archives of Singapore. 
131 “Wipe out ‘rotten aspects’ of Western culture, says MP,” The Straits Times, September 27th, 1970, 8. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19700927-1.2.48.aspx  
132 “Parents rapped for hippism,” The Straits Times, September 24th, 1970, 15. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19700924-1.2.65.aspx  
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lifestyles of crime and with lifestyles in close contact with the music scene, as this article in the 
Straits Times in 1970 shows:133 
 
The attempt to link the act of having long hair to lifestyles of music (“worked with a band”), 
idleness and joblessness (“saying that he was jobless for the rest of the week”), and ultimately 
crime (“admitted stealing a bicycle”) is clear, in large part because of the sheer randomness 
associated with the presence of this article. A report on such a petty crime might be considered 
unusual in and of itself, but the focus on the youth’s hairstyle instead of other factors which might 
be considered of interest to the public – such as the motivation behind the crime, the way in which 
the youth was caught, and the evidence provided – lends an almost absurd and comical air to the 
article. In 1972, the government ordered a three-night surveillance of nightspots, concluding that 
                                                     
133 “A long-haired youth explains,” The Straits Times, December 29th, 1970, 15. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19701229-1.2.119.aspx  
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many of them were havens for young drug users. A list of characteristics of such havens and young 
drug takers was published in the press, including the use of “psychedelic lights, abstract art, loud 
‘soul’ music” and “long hair… colored T-shirts,… bell bottoms, loose blouses and jockey-caps.”134 
This enterprise went further than the making of statements bemoaning the hairstyle choices 
of the youth. In fact, this actually extended into policy decisions made by the government, to the 
chagrin of the youth (and sometimes even other states!135). In June 1970, TV Singapore banned 
male artists with long hair from appearing in any locally recorded programs.136 Suspicions were 
voiced that foreign programs which were cut had been removed because they featured actors with 
long hair, even if that was not the reason officially stated by the stations.137 Schoolboys spotted 
with “hippie-hairstyles… like side-burns, or mop of hair at the neck (sic)” were made to receive 
immediate haircuts, with daily inspections to ensure compliance.138 The government also issued a 
warning that government departments would “snub” people with “long, untidy hair,” who were, 
under the government’s explicit directions, likely to find themselves “ignored at the office counter 
or served last.” This article, too, referred directly to the apparent rise of “hippie culture” in 
                                                     
134 Among other conclusions the report reached was that Singapore’s drug scene ‘resembles fairly closely those of Western 
societies’ and that many young girls, ‘invariably from good, middle-class families’, were now frequenting these nightspots to 
take drugs, after which they would be ‘picked up and “bedded down” by boys.’ The use of drugs at such places was also linked to 
the bands playing there; another attempt to associate drug use with music. Reference: “‘High flyers’ who make the scene in 
coffee houses, discos and bowling alleys,” The Straits Times, July 9th, 1972, 10. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19720709-1.2.45.aspx  
 
135 In one incident in 1970 which caused a diplomatic commotion, three Malaysian youths who had been detained by the 
Singapore police on suspicion of gang activities had their long hair cut by the police (although the Ministry of Interior and 
Defense and higher-ups in the police departments claimed not to have issued such instructions, and later said that the “hair-
snipping operation” had been stopped).  
Reference: “Police stop snipping of hippie hair,” The Straits Times, September 3rd, 1970, 1. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19700903-1.2.10.aspx 
 
136 “TV S’pore bans long-haired artistes,” The Straits Times, June 10th, 1970, 27. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19700610-1.2.10.aspx  
137 “TV ban on popular Mamas and Papas pop group?” The Straits Times, August 7th, 1970, 10. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19700807-1.2.84.aspx 
138 “Just how long is long hair?” The Straits Times, July 15th, 1970, 6. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19700715-1.2.40.aspx  
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Singapore as the impetus for strong action.139 The message was broadcast not just through the 
media, but directly through employers’ organizations such as the Singapore Manufacturers’ 
Association, playing on their fear of losing lucrative government contracts to get compliance from 
their members.140 
It would be unfair, however, to say that the government alone pushed for all these 
clampdowns. Indeed, it received strong support from some sections of society. Before very long, 
the aforementioned government policies found vocal supporters. The Singapore Teachers Union, 
for one, applauded directives from the Ministry of Education to forcibly cut the hair of schoolboys 
with “hippie hair tops” – a Straits Times article declared that “lads with long locks will find very 
few, if any at all, supporters for their cause,” with both parents and teachers rallying behind the 
Ministry’s efforts.141  
Likewise, the early 1980s saw a surge in public debate about the nature and effects of 
listening to rock music. One of the key drivers of this debate was one Tow Siang Hwa, a 
gynecologist and obstetrician who by happenstance was also the chairman of a fund-raising 
committee for the Singapore Symphony Orchestra, which was also falling short of its $10 million 
target by $4.2 million at the end of 1982. At a fund-raising concert cum dinner in December that 
year, he argued that listening to rock music led to “drug abuse, moral anarchy, sex perversion, 
social alienation, youth rebellion, rejection of established norms of common decency, anti-
establishment outbursts, senseless violence and wanton vandalism.” Quoting “scientific” studies 
                                                     
139 “Govt depts. Will snub people with long, untidy hair,” The Straits Times, February 24th, 1971, 17. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19710224-1.2.85.aspx  
 
140 “Employers warned of long-haired employees,” The Straits Times, February 25th, 1971, 3. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19710225-1.2.24.aspx  
141 “Bagus! Teachers and parents welcome ‘trim the long hair’ order,” The Straits Times, May 20th, 1970, 15. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19700520-1.2.123.aspx  
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apparently demonstrating the destructive effects of rock music on the health of sweet corn plants 
and guinea pigs, he also suggested that it might be appropriate to classify rock music as “more 
dangerous than heroin”. Instead of allowing this degeneracy, he opined, the authorities should step 
in to protect the youth from such destructive forms of music, instead trying to inculcate in them a 
taste for the finer, or “serious”, sorts of aural entertainment. The Singapore Symphony Orchestra 
was a particularly outstanding example of this, he added.142 The fact that the Ministry of Culture 
banned rock concerts at the National Theatre just two days after this report, quoting repeated 
instances of vandalism and unruly behavior by rock concert-goers, served only to further enflame 
public opinion about the issue.143 Multiple letters were written to the press both in support of Tow 
and in defense of rock music, to the point where Tow felt compelled to speak up again, saying: 
“I’m glad that I have provoked some people to think and I’m sorry if the truth has to hurt,” also 
admitting that his religious sentiments probably contributed to his distaste for rock music.144  
With the rising tide of interest in and active participation in the arts scene, it was perhaps 
inevitable that the government was soon forced to recognize the futility of standing firm against 
it. Nevertheless, the conviction that an unfettered spread of “yellow” culture would place the very 
foundations of society in mortal peril ruled that option unthinkable. The only feasible option, 
                                                     
142 Tow claimed that studies conducted at Temple Buell College had shown that playing rock music at plants for three hours a 
day caused them to wilt. He also said that the University of Tennessee had shown that guinea pigs exposed to four hours of rock 
music suffered from shriveled cochlear (inner ear) cells. Ultimately, he warned that if rock music was not stopped in its tracks, 
the youth who listened to it might be “mesmerized into a state of physical and moral oblivion”, and have “their health and careers 
ruined through rock and drug-related orgies” (which he suggested had happened to innumerable rock fans).  
Reference: “Rock is violent and harmful – doctor,” The Straits Times, December 9th, 1982, 11. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19821209-1.2.50.aspx  
143 “Rocking into bad times,” The Straits Times, December 11th, 1982, 29. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19821211-1.2.150.43.2.aspx  
144 “I’m sorry if the truth hurts, says Dr Tow,” The Straits Times, December 19th, 1982, 19. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19821219-1.2.44.aspx  
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therefore, was to ensure that the development of the arts scene in general took place on the 
government’s own terms. 
c. From condemnation to co-optation 
By the 1980s the government realized that it could no longer adamantly refuse to allow the arts 
scene to grow. In 1979, Communications Minister and acting Culture Minister Ong Teng Cheong 
argued in a public statement that Singapore could now aim for the “total person”, as Singapore had 
achieved sufficient economic development to pay attention to non-economic aspects of life. He 
quoted lifting pressures in the immediately preceding years as having allowed the government 
some room, especially in terms of money and other resources, to focus on non-economic areas. 
Interestingly, when questioned about the development of a unique Singaporean culture, he 
suggested that “various ethnic groups should retain their own cultures yet at the same time expand 
on their vast cultural experience to develop freely a ‘new culture’.”145 This approach would 
continue even into the mid-1980s with economic troubles looming.146 
In December 1984, Goh Chok Tong made a speech proposing a new direction at a press 
conference on the eve of Nomination Day for the General Elections. Entitled “Singapore, City of 
Excellence – A Vision for Singapore by 1999,” the speech laid out broad goals and objectives. 
Among others, the state wanted to equal the 1984 standard of living of Switzerland, and exceed 
that of America and Japan, by 1999; luxuriant images of “windsurfing and boating” and “long 
stretches of white sandy beach” were also given much airtime. The speech articulated two 
                                                     
145 Nancy, Chng. “Aim now is to create the ‘total person,’” The Straits Times, March 1st, 1979, 31. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19790301-1.2.124.2.aspx  
146 In a press briefing regarding the 1986 Festival of the Arts, Minister of State (Community Development) Wong Kan Seng said: 
“We should rightly place priority on resolving our economic problems… (but) life must go on regardless of temporary setbacks.”  
Reference: “More shows, more seats and no queues,” The Straits Times, January 23rd, 1986, 13. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19860123-1.2.19.6.aspx  
State of the Arts: Government, National Identity, and the Arts in Singapore 
65 | P a g e  
2013-2014 Penn Humanities Forum Andrew W. Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final 
Paper, May 2014. Shawn Teo, College of Arts and Sciences 2014, University of Pennsylvania.  
 
overarching goals: to “make Singapore a developed country, and evolve a cultivated society.”147 
Important here is the fact that never at any point in time did the government recognize the 
significance of allowing art to flourish for its own sake, or for aesthetic beauty. Cultural 
development was not an end in itself. It was also a means to an end. As Goh put it in the same 
speech, “a developed country means… attributes of a mature people: cohesive, tolerant, well 
educated.” The following year, he exhorted Singaporeans to “find fulfilment in non-material 
pursuits” and to encourage a “creative, stimulating, and culturally-vibrant environment.”148 
Allowing the “wrong” type of culture to flourish imperiled society; encouraging the growth of the 
“right” type of culture would help it climb even higher. Still, the line between what was considered 
“wrong” and “right” continued to blur and shift. 
In the mid-1980s, the government decided, for example, to reverse direction from their old 
stance of banning rock concerts to holding Police Force-organized rock concerts and disco nights 
from 1985-1987.149 Held in the Police Academy Compound, the events attracted a fair amount of 
attention, and were even free of charge.  
                                                     
147 Chok Tong, Goh, “Singapore: a city for the future… and what we must do to achieve this vision by 1999,” The Straits Times, 
December 12th, 1984, 16. http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19841212-1.2.21.19.aspx   
148 “Chok Tong’s new goals,” The Straits Times, February 27th, 1985,  
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19850227-1.2.2.aspx  
149 “Cops organize rock show,” Singapore Monitor – Afternoon Edition, July 5th, 1985, 4. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/singmonitor19850705-2.2.6.9.3.aspx  
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Fifty thousand people, according to news reports, came to the 1985 concert, with members 
of the Police band performing on stage as well. Even the President and Home Affairs Minister 
showed up at one point.150 In an interview given to the press, the Commissioner of Police explained 
that the move was seen as necessary to reach out to the youth and improve the image of the police 
among them, as the police had realized that the old position of flatly denying any artistic value or 
place in society to rock music was no longer tenable.151 Commissioner of Police Goh Yong Hong 
called it “the greatest education in the local youth culture”, having realized that “the police force 
could no longer escape from the fact that rock ‘n’ roll and pop music seemed to be the energy 
centre of youth culture.” Quotes from performers in those articles demonstrated their appreciation 
for this “olive branch”.152 Members of the public, too, reacted favorably to the organization of the 
                                                     
150 “An upbeat note all night long at Police Academy,” The Straits Times, September 16th, 1985, 11. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19850916-1.2.23.1.aspx   
151 “Rock and the police force do mix,” The Straits Times, September 20th, 1985, 3. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19850920-1.2.83.7.1.aspx.  
See also: “Police on the rock ‘n’ roll beat,” The Straits Times, September 13th, 1985, 8. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19850913-1.2.138.13.2.aspx  
152 Patrick Lee, the vocalist of the band Speedway, said: “It’s something that we’ve hoped for for so long, for the police, who can 
control a crowd that can get too drunk on music, are the best people to organize large rock concerts.” 
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concert. The police themselves said they had been heartened by the relative lack of violence or 
other undesirable behavior among the crowd that night.153The Singapore Armed Forces, too, 
organized National Day rock concerts along the main shopping street, Orchard Road, from 1988-
1990.  
This practice of regulation and co-option was not implemented solely for “newer” forms 
of culture, though. Clammer speaks of the tendency of the Singaporean government to co-opt any 
burgeoning cultural tradition which it felt it could make use of, raising the example of the 
development of “Peranakan Place” in the late 1970s, when the government reacted to increasing 
interest in Peranakan culture by setting up “Peranakan Place” as a museum with guides and 
exhibits. This, to Clammer, resulted simply in “a rather crass commercialism… [which] has 
virtually no connection with the minority culture on which it was supposed to be modelled.”154 He 
points out, rightly, the inherent contradiction in the desire to monetize any opportunity available 
with the rhetoric of the importance of preserving traditional culture and values. In 1985, the 
government spent S$10 million setting up a commercial center Geylang Serai, modeled after the 
Malay village (“kampong”) which the government had eradicated in favor of modern housing 
projects decades earlier. The project was intended to showcase “Malay culture.”155 Likewise, 
Serangoon Road, which has historically hosted a concentration of immigrants and temporary 
                                                     
153 “Rock show lifts ties with police,” The Straits Times, September 18th, 1985, 13. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19850918-1.2.24.20.aspx  
154 The government even, apparently, set up a coffee shop, restaurant and shops in a building next door which they thought was 
Peranakan in architecture, before having it pointed out to them by experts (consulted rather too late in the process) that it was 
nothing of the sort.  
Reference: Clammer. Race and State in Independent Singapore 1965-1990: 64 
155 “S’pore’s $10m ‘kampung,’” The Straits Times, October 10th, 1985, 40. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19851010-1.2.61.aspx  
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workers from South India, was “explicitly racialized” and specifically marketed as evidence of the 
racial diversity in Singapore.156  
Thus, while evidence supports the idea that there was a movement towards the public 
recognition of the value of the arts in the late 1970s to mid-1980s, it is evident that economics had 
not been shelved for the moment, as might have been implied by the statements of leaders. As with 
Clammer’s assessment of the “crass commercialism” inherent in support for the arts, the 
perspective, especially among some artists, was that the state’s interest in the arts was wholly 
pragmatic. Alvin Tan, who co-founded The Necessary Stage in 1987 and went on to become an 
award-winning play director, said: 
They wanted tourism. It was more for the purpose of tourism. Never [was] it for the 
inherent worth of the arts… the Singapore Tourism Board carried out a survey to find out 
how much money was activated in the economy if people went out to watch a show and 
they had to pay for the taxi and the transport, and then they had to go for food… in the ‘80s 
it was ‘cultural industries’, how the arts could influence the economic industries and make 
it more creative. This was started in Britain, and influenced a lot of governments in other 
countries, including ours… the musicals and all that… more connected to GDP, industry, 
the arts that are more commodified and commercial will usually find a place in the arts 
ecology in Singapore.157 
The economic and monetary focus of the bureaucracies and red tape inherent in the 
processing of grant applications, applications for performance space and so on took its toll on 
performers, directors, musicians, and administrators alike. Christina Sergeant, an American 
expatriate from Massachusetts who moved to Singapore and ended up co-founding the Actors 
                                                     
156 Care should be taken, though, to recognize that this was not an attempt to create housing enclaves, simply to emphasize and 
promote what seemed to be the historical and cultural associations of particular areas with particular races or ethnicities, in turn 
further reifying ethnic and racial groupings, as discussed in the previous chapter. Reference: Goh, R. B H. Contours of Culture: 
Space and Social Difference in Singapore (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2005): 90 
157 Alvin Tan. Interview with Shawn Teo. Digital recording. June 16th, 2013.  
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Theatre Circle in 1989 and serving as artistic director of the Singapore Theatre Repertory 
Showcase (STARS), commented: 
It was getting harder and harder to rehearse because [of] just the amount of work (sic) 
which had to be done for putting shows on. The paperwork, it was very strict in those 
days… you had to register everybody… if you had a foreigner, even if they weren’t getting 
paid, you had to get special passes… there was an entertainment tax in effect in those days, 
so you had to put up as a bond [of] 35% of the total possible gross of the show.158 
One of the major reasons why the government’s policies ended up being restrictive, even as they 
tried to be supportive in some ways, was the lack of alternate sources of support for the arts. 
Sasitharan stated:  
All theatres belonged to the state. There was no way to present a play, or exhibition, 
without the state being involved. There were no free, independent spaces. There is no 
correlate to the American notion of the individual supporter of the arts – no foundation, 
organization to support a particular kind of aesthetic, alternative or otherwise. Everything 
was channeled through the state… informal performances, in temples and so on, outside 
normal space – clan associations, cultural organizations, were whittled away. Everything 
became connected to the state. 
With nowhere else to go for financial support or performance spaces, theatre groups and artists 
etc. often had to consent to the state’s conditions in order to put on their performances. Even then, 
resources were extremely scarce. Sergeant recalled (emphasis added): 
In those days, the only ones who were paid were the musicians, and even many of them 
donated their wages… it was strictly voluntary, community theatre… it was a big deal 
when the administrators get paid, and even then you really had to work for it. We worked 
five days a week, sometimes a sixth day, and then we went off to rehearse… we were 
getting paid pathetic amounts, nothing you could support yourself on, at least back then. 
You have to have a desk to be valid in the arts in Singapore. If you have a desk and a 
computer you are valid and you can be paid, but you can’t be paid for anything else… 
there was a small honorarium for administrators, but that was for daytime work. There 
was nothing for performers or the director. 
                                                     
158 Christian Sergeant. Interview. Tape Recording. National Archives of Singapore.  
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It was clear that the bureaucratic, technocratic approach taken by the government – an 
image it had worked hard to cultivate – had ended up strangling the fledgling arts scene even as it 
tried to help it grow (albeit only in certain prescribed ways). When one was behind a desk working 
at a computer, even if one was employed by a theater company, it was still recognizable as “work” 
by the authorities and therefore deserving of wages. Payment for those on stage, though, would 
have seemed intuitively harder to accept as a legitimate occupation on par with office workers. 
The model of technocratic, bureaucratic efficiency precluded the recognition of the jobs not 
concerned with filing, processing, etc. as equally important and deserving of pay.  
Despite this attempt, there were some things the government was unwilling to give up – 
most importantly, its assertion of ultimate authority over the discursive space of understanding and 
expertise in the various art forms. At no point in time did the government ever concede that it did 
not have the requisite knowledge or experience in art forms to place value judgments on the artistic 
and moral worth of various pieces of art, instead holding fast to the principles espoused by those 
like Nair.” Fong Sip Chee, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Labor and President of 
the Singapore Arts Council, had warned against artists studying abroad and becoming affected by 
foreign malaise: “When our artists and sculptors return from [studying and practicing] abroad they 
should remain as artists and sculptors – not as students who would carry back to their homeland 
the problems, the frustrations and the gloom which are found in other countries.” Ultimately, he 
suggested: 
In Singapore, artists have been told that their works should reflect Singapore situations 
and surroundings. Often they react by saying that as artists they could do what they like 
and should not be told what to paint. This is basically correct but what is not understood 
is that in the works of Singapore artists and sculptors there should be something which 
reflect (sic) the values and emotions of the individual artist and also some of the common 
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values and aspirations of Singaporeans or the people with whom they live and are part of 
what Singapore society is.159 
We find in this statement an assertion of the proper role of the artist, with the government 
expressing its confidence that it knew what art should be about (promoting the “values and 
aspirations of Singaporeans”) better than artists did. Furthermore, in their concern for the reflection 
of the values of the Singaporean community, we see that the focus of the government was even 
narrower than merely the promotion of art with “good” artistic value. Instead, what they were 
searching to boost was a type of art which was uniquely Singaporean – which conveyed the essence 
of what it meant to be Singaporean, and helped encourage people to partake in that spirit. This was 
intimately bound up with questions of security – the idea being that a cohesive Singaporean 
identity might build on the government’s presentation of itself as objective, rational, and secular, 
and help overcome the centrifugal forces of race, religion, ethnicity, language and so on which 
might otherwise prove insurmountably divisive, as well as the negative influences from external 
sources. 
The Singapore Youth Festival, or SYF, launched in 1967 by the Ministry of Education, 
was established as a festival in which schools would take part in various types of activities, 
including music, dance, and (in the early days) sports. It quickly became a field of intense 
competition between schools to produce medalists.160 By the late 1970s, the Minister for Home 
Affairs and Education, Chua Sian Chin, explained that the SYF was important because it helped 
immunize the youth against negative influences from the West, by helping them to “learn that there 
                                                     
159 Sip Chee, Fong, “Speech in Declaring Open the Sculpture Exhibition by Mr. Ng Eng Teng” (Speech, National Library, 
October 25th, 1972) http://drm.a2o.nas.sg/DJVUServer/PdfStampServlet?app=stars&filepath=pdfdoc/PressR19721025i.pdf  
160 Joseph David. Interview with Chong Ching Liang. Tape recording. April 25th, 2000. National Archives of Singapore. Last 
accessed 20th October 2013. 
http://drm.a2o.nas.sg/DJVUServer/PdfStampServlet?app=cord_data&filepath=2309/OHC002309_015.pdf  
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are many things in [Singapore’s] cultural heritage which they can be proud of.” This was 
significant as Western influence could be curtailed, he opined, as long as the youth were “well 
rooted in their own cultural background and are conscious of their Singapore identity.” 161 
A spokesperson for Ministry of Culture outlined the role the Ministry saw itself playing in 
the arts: it wanted to “inculcate certain desired norms and values into citizens,… to instill moral 
principles based on our heritage, and to cultivate taste,” as well as to “upgrade the quality of 
cultural performances and… attract more audiences.” This last one was especially important 
because “third or fourth generation Singaporeans have lost some of their forefathers’ traditions 
and are developing a Singaporean cultural identity.”162 Ironically, as we shall see, this search often 
led to further attempts to regulate the artistic sphere, sometimes putting them at odds with many 
artists who were themselves looking for a way to make art belong to Singaporeans – even if that 
“identity” was found to be something that displeased the government.  
On one hand, the government took positive action to encourage “Singaporean” art. In 1979, 
the government instituted a new award called the “Cultural Medallion”, to be conferred by the 
Minister for Culture on people who “have attained achievement in the arts and letters,” however 
that was to be defined.163 The reaction from civil society was mostly positive. Many were 
supportive and applauded the government’s move.164Among the first recipients of this award was 
Edwin Thumboo, a famous poet considered by many to be one of the pioneers of literature and 
                                                     
161 Sian Chin, Chua, “Speech at the Official Opening of the 11th Singapore Youth Festival” (Speech, National Theater, July 9th, 
1977) http://drm.a2o.nas.sg/DJVUServer/PdfStampServlet?app=stars&filepath=pdfdoc/csc19770709s.pdf  
162 “Nurturing the arts,” The Straits Times, October 10th, 1979. http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19791010-
1.2.131.10.aspx  
163 “A new Cultural Medallion Award,” The Straits Times, February 17th, 1979, 1. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19790217-1.2.7.aspx  
164 “‘Medallion will help boost culture,’” The Straits Times, February 21st, 1979, 8. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19790221-1.2.58.aspx  
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particularly poetry in Singapore. In 1977, Thumboo had publicly called for Tamil and Chinese 
writers to work towards the formation of a “Singaporean identity”, and for them to bring the best 
parts of their cultures “into the notion of a Singapore identity,” placing him in substantial 
agreement with the government in that regard.165  
Also in 1979, the government announced that it was willing to help defray the costs of 
publishing for local writers under a plan to “enrich the literature of Singapore.” Under this plan 
(suggested by Thumboo), writers who had found publishers who were interested in their work but 
who could not afford to publish could apply to the government for financial aid. Their application 
would be assessed by a panel with representatives from the government, private sector, and 
academics, all of whom would be “knowledgeable in that particular field of literary work” and 
who would submit their recommendations to the government. Furthermore, the government 
subsidized a half-yearly literary journal “containing creative works of local writers, to be published 
initially in English.”166 In 1983, the “Patron of the Arts Award” was created to recognize 
organizations, public or private, for supporting cultural and artistic values (the main criteria being 
donations of at least $100,000 a year to cultural and artistic activities for three years in a row).167 
In 1985, the “Arts Housing Scheme” was introduced. Old buildings were converted for use by arts 
groups, with each group paying only a nominal rent and utilities bill.168  
                                                     
165 “Writers told: work for Singapore identity,” The Straits Times, April 11th, 1977, 15. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19770411-1.2.99.aspx  
166 “Writers can get into print with govt aid,” The Straits Times, November 17th, 1979, 23. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19791117-1.2.104.aspx  
167 “Cutural medallions,” Singapore Monitor, April 18th, 1986, 14. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/singmonitor19850418-1.2.21.4.aspx  
168 “Life centre for nine arts groups,” The Straits Times, May 16th, 1989, 5. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19890516-1.2.67.7.1.aspx  
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As discussed earlier, these attempts were met with a considerable amount of skepticism 
from many practitioners of the arts in Singapore. Many artists came to believe that the state’s 
attempts to aid and guide the development of the cultural and artistic scene contained inherent 
problems. Inherent in the notion of “encouragement” was the fact that resources were granted only 
to select groups, based on criteria decided by the government. There were worries that the awards 
and grants might be given only to “classical talent” recognized by the Ministry, instead of in other 
fields. Sasitharan, when asked about the impact that the government’s approach towards art had, 
said: 
It was certainly very pragmatic. On one hand you had administrative efficiency - 
professionalization - that the state brought in. Infrastructural efficiencies were put in 
place. But there were consequences to that, because it tended to curtail diversity. It 
removed possibilities, it structured and restricted… with every efficiency there are 
limitations. When something is enabled, something is disabled.169 
While they accepted that the government had turned to focus more on the arts, they believed that 
the degree and method of government support necessarily encumbered the artistic process, 
especially because they believed that the government had ulterior motives, economic and political, 
for pursuing the arts anyway.  
Moreover, even during this period the arts continued to be perceived as a threat. In an 
infamous episode in 1987, sixteen people were arrested, detained without trial, and accused of 
taking part in a Marxist conspiracy to overthrow the government. Five of the sixteen were members 
of a drama group established in 1983 called the Third Stage. The newspaper reports about the issue 
clearly show that the government remained deeply wary of the arts as a means of threatening the 
security of the state: 
                                                     
169 Thirunalan Sasitharan. Interview by Shawn Teo. Digital recording. Intercultural Theater Institute. June 26th, 2013 
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The statement by the Home Affairs Ministry above showed the thin, blurred line that artists 
had to tread between what could be considered “legitimate” criticism and “destructive,” 
“radicalizing” criticism – which, in this case, simply amounted to presenting the social and 
political system in a bad light.170 A subsequent report published in the papers cast the desire of 
artists to function as “pressure groups” and to “criticize” the government in an extremely negative 
light (Tan Wah Piow being the supposed mastermind behind the conspiracy).171 Other groups 
incriminated included the Catholic Church and the Law Society. This was part of a much longer 
story which there is no time or space to do justice to here. It is sufficient to note that the government 
continued to see the arts as a threat, even while supporting it. 
                                                     
170 “Drama used to radicalize public,” The Straits Times, May 27th, 1987, 15. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19870527-1.2.20.21.7.aspx  
171 “‘Through drama, you can criticize,’”, The Straits Times, July 10th, 1987, 10. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Page/straitstimes19870720-1.1.10.aspx  
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Nevertheless, artists were not about to surrender all artistic license and control over their 
artistic projects despite facing pressure from all sides. In fact, many of them decided to discuss 
issues of politics and national identity through their works. The ways in which artists responded 
to the government through their art will be the focus of the next chapter. 
  
State of the Arts: Government, National Identity, and the Arts in Singapore 
77 | P a g e  
2013-2014 Penn Humanities Forum Andrew W. Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final 
Paper, May 2014. Shawn Teo, College of Arts and Sciences 2014, University of Pennsylvania.  
 
Chapter Three 
The tale of the arts scene in Singapore is, contrary to what some detractors might think, storied 
and complex. The sheer variety of art forms, falling into multiple categories – traditional or not, 
performing or not, vernacular or not – means that the following chapter must necessarily be 
summative. Rather than doing a superficial survey of the subject, it would be more informative to 
concentrate on a particular area and discuss it in more detail. Therefore, due solely to the 
constraints of time and space for this thesis, and accessibility to the author, the following chapter 
will examine some important and interesting works for the English arts scene in Singapore, 
focusing particularly on plays and short stories. It must be noted, though, that this category is in 
itself problematic – indeed the definition of some plays and works as “English” and others as “non-
English” may work well for some plays and artworks, but becomes far less satisfactory for others 
which are multilingual. Some of them even directly questioned the use of language itself. It is in 
this light that we can begin to conceptualize how arts practitioners thought about the Singaporean 
voice, and tried to present a uniquely Singaporean voice in their work. Through this, we can also 
begin to learn about the way in which Singaporeans had started to conceive of questions of identity 
and nationhood. 
a. Politics in the Arts 
In contrast to the view that the government exerted almost total control over the arts scene, 
forcing artists and writers to steer away from political issues, many in fact did write works which 
dealt with politics, or had political implications for the way the government wanted to portray 
itself. In doing so, they demonstrated how the politics of the state had to a large extent become 
ingrained in the national identity of Singaporeans. What Singaporeans valued in government, the 
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type of government they expected and were prepared to support and/or tolerate, their attitude 
towards things like the arts – all effectively became part of the defining characteristics of 
Singaporeans. 
One good example would be the works of Robert Yeo. Yeo, a playwright, poet, and novelist 
who was active from the 1970s onwards (he was also chair of the Ministry of Culture’s drama 
advisory group from 1977 to 1990, and was awarded a Public Service Medal in 1991 for services 
to drama), wrote a trilogy of plays which has come to be known as “the Singapore trilogy.” The 
first, Are You There, Singapore? was staged in 1974; the second, One Year Back Home, was staged 
in 1980, and the third, Changi, was staged in 1996. 
In many ways, the trilogy was groundbreaking – the plays were among the first to openly 
discuss politics. To what extent did a play like One Year Back Home manage to provide an 
alternative political narrative to that of the government? The answer to this depends on the reading 
of the play itself, in particular the most overtly political characters. Chye and Hua are a pair of 
Singaporean siblings both studying in London. Chye, the brother, intends to join the PAP on his 
return to Singapore. Their friend and schoolmate, Reggie (portrayed by Sasitharan Thirunalan), 
evinces leftist views, and joins the Opposition on his return. A significant portion of the play is 
dedicated to arguments between Chye and Reggie on various topics. The arguments were so clearly 
political and so clearly relevant to extant debates about the nature of politics in Singapore that Yeo, 
recalling the run of the play in the theatre, said that he “observed some sections of the audience 
gripping the hand-rests of their seats in disbelief at hearing the heated exchanges between Reggie 
and Chye; others in the audience laughed uncomfortably.”172 Topics of discussion and argument 
                                                     
172 Robert Yeo, One Year Back Home (Manila: Solidarity Foundation, 1990).  
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between the two, which often became emotional, included the necessity (or lack thereof) for an 
opposition to the PAP in Parliament, or the issue of long hair (discussed in the previous chapter). 
All this takes place in the context of the two friends competing against each other in a by-election 
for a seat in Parliament, vacated by the death of the current PAP MP. At the end of One Year Back 
Home, Chye wins the election under the PAP banner, while Reggie is arrested for having made 
what Chye calls extremist statements, which apparently demonstrates subversive and criminal 
tendencies (this would come to seem prescient during the 1987 arrests mentioned in the previous 
chapter). Chye’s role in Reggie’s arrest is unclear – did he call for Reggie to be arrested, or was it 
his political bosses higher up in the government which demanded it? The audience was left to 
decide for themselves.  
Based on the ending of the play, some argued that Yeo had shown his hand by having Chye 
come up on top. Singh says that “in 1980, many felt that Yeo was playing safe… he had loaded 
the dice against the Opposition.” This was by no means a foregone conclusion, as he cautioned 
readers that “by obviously being on the side of Chye, Robert may in fact be criticizing the system 
even more.”  He demonstrates Chye’s hypocrisy (intentional or otherwise) at times such as when 
the two argue about the long hair issue. Reggie opines that the restrictions on long hair infringe on 
individual freedoms; Chye retorts: “Does personal liberty reside in long hair?” As Singh notes, 
though, Chye had just minutes earlier explained the symbolic political value of the PAP’s dress 
code (all white; supposed to symbolize purity): “Chye himself believes in the symbolic value of 
appearances. So, long hair could symbolize political liberty. But, of course, Chye would be obtuse 
to that!” 
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Indeed, hidden within One Year Back Home was a subtle critique of the political system in 
Singapore. It is perhaps because of its relevance that there Yeo encountered problems both 
publishing and staging it.  
For the staging of the play, the government took much longer than usual to give its permit. 
Kirpal Singh, currently an associate professor of English at Singapore Management University, 
wrote that this indicated the relevance of the play, and the government’s fear that this would be 
politically damaging to them.173 Even publishing it after it had already been staged was a hassle. 
As Yeo himself put it in a preface to the published edition of One Year Back Home (published in 
1990, ten years after it was first staged):  
The play was regarded as so sensitive that it had to go through the Deputy Director, the 
Parliamentary Secretary, and the Acting Minister for Culture. 1980 was, it is important to 
remember, an election year… one company suggested that I delete all reference to the 
People’s Action Party and Singapore; another cautioned me against going ahead else my 
career should suffer… In the eighties, attempts to get the play published here and in 
Malaysia and UK came to nothing. The latest attempt locally to find a publisher met with 
the meek excuse that it was not yet the policy to publish creative writing.174  
Even when the government did not clamp down on artists and civil society, the possibility of 
retaliation, official or otherwise, was enough to scare people into self-censorship. Yeo was not the 
only writer to encounter such problems. Catherine Lim said: 
That is what I saw in our society, and that is why I want to tell the government, when they 
say ‘we don’t censor anything.’ I say, ‘wait a minute.’ The climate of fear already induces 
self-censorship. So when I [wrote] a little collection of stories, one called Oh Singapore, 
satirical, fun stories about Singapore, making fun of our frequent campaigns, you know, 
kiasu [an extremely competitive mentality characterized by a fear of losing out] and so on 
– no publisher wanted to take it up. No publisher. Because they got scared. And the 
publisher who finally took it on, Times, had one condition: I had to eliminate one or two 
                                                     
173 Yeo, One Year Back Home. 
174 Ibid. 
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stories, toning down, which I complied with, otherwise nobody would – which to me is a 
pity.175 
In other words, direct and overt opposition to the government was not necessary for artists to make 
politically important statements, and both the government and civil society knew it. So long as 
artists stayed out of the areas which were obviously “out of bounds” – race and religion in 
particular – the government grudgingly allowed it. Artists, playwrights and writers, too, adapted 
their strategies to ensure that they could continue producing. Alvin Tan said: 
The aesthetic strategies we used were not confrontational… in a way where we just 
challenged the state. A lot of activists and artists take… an oppositional position, speak 
truth to power... But what The Necessary Stage did is that we looked at alternative theatre 
as alternative positions… we can [oppose] the government when it’s required… but 
sometimes we can work with the government, like arts education. No conflict there, we 
work hand in hand. But there are also other positions which are tangential, and they are 
alternative, and we also occupy these positions. They’re not directly confrontational, 
they’re just different… not diametrically opposed… we don’t like that kind of work, it’s 
counter-didactic and very tiring, because it polarizes, and a work that polarizes is not a 
good artwork for me… multiple perspectives for me is stronger and more inclusive and not 
only [to be] anti-establishment.176 
While direct critique of the establishment was avoided, playwrights and writers could use 
more roundabout methods to call attention to what they thought were important issues. In the 
process of doing so they would often come into conflict with the government’s official narratives. 
In the previous chapters, we saw how the government insisted on portraying itself as 
rational, secular, and objective, and saw that the bureaucracy and technocracy were outgrowths of 
this. This occurred to such an extent that it became something which Singaporeans were able to 
identify with easily. As Sasitharan put it, “government control became a point of criticism, parody 
and subversion.” The government’s presentation of itself became a particular point of parody. 
                                                     
175 Catherine Lim. Interview with Shawn Teo. Digital Recording. Centrepoint. July 23rd, 2013.  
176 Alvin Tan. Interview with Shawn Teo. Digital recording. Parkway Parade. June 16th, 2013.  
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In 1985, the Third Stage put up a play entitled Oh! Singapore.177 The play was composed 
of a rapid series of vignettes. One such scene begins with a typical family at work and play in a 
kampong, when suddenly a bulldozer arrives and crushes their village, burying them beneath the 
rubble, and making a pointed statement about the pace of modernization and industrialization in 
Singapore, which itself was linked to the government’s rhetoric about the importance of unceasing 
economic progress. The very final scene sees a series of characters walk onto stage to the sound 
of marching drums in the background, while they complain about their exhaustion from the 
incessant pace of life in Singapore and the amount of work they are expected to do. The drumbeats 
lend a military air to the pseudo-parade, showing the way in which the drive for growth and 
progress could be seen or felt as a form of slave-driving and lead to exhaustion. Another scene 
makes fun of the endless series of campaigns designed by the government to promote various 
actions, such as cleanliness, good manners, and to quash undesirable arts: 
“Actors move into two rows, in crab-like movement crossing each other at the centre. 
First Row: No doubt there are lots of rules. 
Second Row: Follow them like all civilized people do. 
Actor 1: No sticking bills 
Actor 2: No hawking 
Actor 3: No littering 
Actor 4: No smoking 
Actor 5: No parking 
Actor 6: No jaywalking 
Actor 7: No crossing 
Actor 1: No dialects 
Actor 2: No break dancing 
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Actor 3: No spitting 
All: Thus everything is FINE, FINE, FINE 
All: But that’s not all, 
We need to keep healthy 
We need to keep sane 
Yes, we need campaigns and more campaigns!” 
A vignette near the end makes the point very explicit: 
“Scene 13: Television Broadcast 
Regal music. Enter one actor in a solemn manner. 
Actor: And because we are small, 
Mistakes we can’t afford to make, 
For we’ll lose everything, one and all 
And then it’ll be too late 
 
So have trust in what our elders say 
And do what they want us to do 
Just work hard, play hard, don’t think too much 
Let them decide what’s best for you.” 
The statements made here are strongly reminiscent of the government’s paternalistic 
attitude, as conveyed in speeches like Lee’s Helsinki speech in 1971, when he declared that it was 
the job of the government to protect people from the press, and when the government took it upon 
itself to differentiate “culture” from “yellow culture” in order to protect the people. The supposed 
superior knowledge of the government was hence laughed at in productions such as this one. 
That same year, Kuo Pao Kun wrote his landmark monologue The Coffin Is Too Big for 
the Hole. Kuo Pao Kun was a playwright whose influence and importance to the Singapore arts 
scene cannot be overstated. Born in China, he moved to Singapore in his childhood. He was 
State of the Arts: Government, National Identity, and the Arts in Singapore 
84 | P a g e  
2013-2014 Penn Humanities Forum Andrew W. Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final 
Paper, May 2014. Shawn Teo, College of Arts and Sciences 2014, University of Pennsylvania.  
 
detained without trial from 1976 to 1980 under suspicion of Communist activity, and had his 
citizenship revoked. Nevertheless, upon his release he continued to work in the drama scene, and 
wrote several highly important works, on top of actively supporting the community through 
negotiations with the government for funds, holding directing workshops etc. and becoming an 
important mentor to many of the younger generation of artists, such as Tan and Sharma. Sharma 
referred to Kuo as “the most important theatre artist. His plays stand the test of time. At the same 
time he was also a director, and he was a director with a vision.”178 Tan identified Kuo’s works as 
some of the most important local works of art, and said that his experimental style heavily affected 
English language practitioners.179 More than his literary style, though, Kuo’s stature was also due 
to his strong personality, and he came to be a leader in the arts scene, as Tan said: 
…looking at him as an artist, how he… negotiated with authority in the work and in his 
negotiations with the National Arts Council, I was in a couple of panels that he was on 
when we met the NAC. I was also with him when we were doing a collaboration and he 
was negotiating with the Singapore Arts Festival for more money. And the way he 
challenged them and after that went round shaking their hands – his strategy and skills were 
excellent. It was very clear that he was fighting for the local artists, and he was very… 
uncompromising when he fights. But after that he would go round and shake their hands, 
just so they make sure they know there are no hard feelings, that it was his duty… He’s a 
leader, an intellectual, and an artist that you can see the artistry also in how he negotiates. 
It’s not like he’s an artist and his art is contained [only] in his artwork… We don’t have [a 
leader like] that anymore [after Kuo’s death in 2002.180 
Kuo’s monologue, The Coffin Is Too Big for the Hole, is delivered by a young man who, 
at his grandfather’s funeral, finds that his grandfather’s coffin is quite literally too big for the hole 
dug for it. He confronts the man in charge of the funeral parlor, with results predictable for most 
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Singaporeans used to the narrative of bureaucracy and obsession with rules created by the 
government. After some argumentation, he finally reaches the root of the problem: 
‘All right, then. Get another plot. That would solve the problem, wouldn’t it?’ 
Oh, I was deft! I thought. I was able to solve a nasty problem right there on the spot even 
in my deepest moment of grief, I could. 
But I was wrong. 
‘I’m afraid you can’t, sir,’ he said. ‘You see, sir, the regulation says one dead person is 
allotted one plot. How can you have two graves for one coffin?... It’s not allowed, sir. You 
look at all the other graves in the cemetery. See? All same size. No two graves for one 
person. Everyone standard size!... Sir, you must understand, there is no room for 
exceptions!’181 
The blind obedience to the rules and belief in the importance of following the rules was perhaps a 
natural outgrowth of the government’s narrative of efficiency and bureaucracy. The main character 
demands to see a higher-ranking officer. When confronted with this problem, the officer’s “large, 
intelligent eyes rolled from side to side, betraying the powerful intellect of an obviously high-IQ 
person.” In the end, though, he still refuses to allocate the extra plot to them: 
‘No, no, no, no, no! That will be running against our national planning. You are well aware 
of the fact that we are a densely populated nation with very limited land resources. The 
consideration for humanity and sympathy cannot overstep the constraints of the state 
policy!’ he declared.  
Eventually, though, after an outburst from the main character, the officer is forced to concede after 
consulting his own superior: 
‘All right. Since you are already at the cemetery, and since the coffin has proven itself to 
be too big for the hole, we’ll make this case a very special exception. Because we don’t 
want people to misunderstand us, to read us as being disrespectful of traditions, as being 
hard and unaccommodating to the dead. But… there will only be this one exception and no 
such requests will be entertained ever again!’ 
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The officer’s reframing of the issue creates apparent contradictions with the earlier statement he 
made, that considerations of “humanity” cannot be cause to overlook state policy. This can be 
resolved, however, if one notes that the officer nowhere said in his second statement that he was 
allowing it on the grounds of sympathy for the main character. Instead, just as with the government 
in real life, the officer is concerned mostly with how he and his department will be perceived. The 
PAP could not afford to be perceived as anything less than objective, but it also had to try as far 
as possible to portray itself as respectful of cultures and traditions. The officer in the play concludes 
that the motivating factor for his decision should be the creation of the appropriate public image. 
Humanity and sympathy continue to stay in exile from the realm of policymaking.  
The practice of bureaucracy is portrayed as dangerous in the way it, in turn, oversteps 
common-sense boundaries. No reason is ever given for the rule that each person may occupy only 
one grave; the fact that such a rule exists suffices for all characters in the play. Not even the main 
character questions the reasoning for this. The presumption that rules are to be obeyed based purely 
on the fact of their existence, and that standardization is a good thing, is implicitly believed by 
characters in the play. At the very end, Kuo drops in one last stinger on the dangers of 
standardization: 
Whenever I get to the cemetery and see those graves – the row after row of standard sized 
graves – I cannot resist thinking about the other problem, and this is what really bothers 
me a lot: Now, with them all the same size and same shape, would my sons and daughters, 
and my grandsons and granddaughters after them, be able to find me out and recognize 
me? 
I don’t know… I just don’t know…182 
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In this way, the play also becomes a vehicle for Kuo’s worries about the fate of cultures and 
traditions – perhaps even the arts scene in general. We saw how artists were worried that the 
intrusion of the government into the arts scene, even in a supportive manner, would lead to 
inefficiency and bureaucratization due to the inherent nature of the way the government worked. 
Kuo shows his fear, through the play, that the process of standardization would remove everything 
interesting and unique about each culture and tradition in the government’s effort to make them fit 
into defined categories or boxes.  
The very next year, Kuo wrote another play called No Parking on Odd Days. This was 
another monologue, delivered by a man who had been continually fined for traffic offences. In 
every case, he explains that he could not have known that it was an offence, or he had some other 
excuse, always convincing and legitimate. His young son encourages him to fight the charges. 
However, every time this happens the officers concerned do not bother to explain the logic behind 
the rules to him. They simply advise him that to lodge a complaint he will have to be prepared to 
go to the traffic court to talk to the magistrates. For example, on one occasion he is fined for not 
putting down enough parking coupons to cover the cost of parking for one hour, even though he 
parked for only 40 minutes and did put down enough coupons to cover that cost. He speaks to the 
parking kiosk attendant: 
‘$1.80 per hour means you got to put three 60-cent coupons and tear them together. 
Identical. Otherwise how do you get $1.80? Complain to my senior officers in headquarters 
lah!’  
…As usual there was a long queue and when it came to my turn I made myself very polite 
and carefully worked out the sums again about $1.80 for one hour and $1.20 for 40 minutes, 
‘That is not how we calculate. If you want to complain you can write in officially. And if 
you want to take it further, you can wait for the summons to appear in court and present 
your case to the magistrate.’ 
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Well?... You guessed right again. I paid him the compounded amount of $10. 
‘Father, why don’t you go ahead and write in?’ My boy couldn’t take it anymore… 
‘No use lah, son. No use, I tell you…” Somehow I felt I couldn’t tell him… that the world 
was more complicated than he thought or that people were not as simple as they looked. 
In order to convince his son of the futility of trying to fight his case in the courts, he relates 
an experience from when he was young. Having parked in a space labelled “No Parking on Odd 
Days” and having been fined, it was pointed out to him that another sign a significant distance 
away, which he had not seen, said that that parking spot was for lorries only. He felt that this was 
unjustified as he could not have been expected to walk fifty meters in either direction of the parking 
spot to check for small signs every time he parked. Thus, he decided to challenge his charge in 
court, giving a long explanation as to how he came to be in that situation and giving suggestions 
for improvement in the signage system. The magistrate said: 
‘It is accepted that the sign display was somewhat inadequate,’ he began softly. ‘And it is 
to the credit of the relevant authorities that amends have been made to correct the situation. 
The court appreciates the honesty and frankness of the accused. I’m sure the authorities 
feel the same way about his readiness to make constructive proposals for improving the 
sign display in the said street. Nevertheless, the fact remains that on the said date and place 
the defendant was guilty of parking his vehicle in an unauthorized place. I sentence him to 
a fine of $30 or three days’ imprisonment.’183 
To minds of this sort, obsessed with rules and regulations and what is technically legal or not, Kuo 
argued, considerations of logic and humanity simply go out the window. Kuo also made a larger 
point about how an environment of this sort affects Singaporeans growing up in it, and inculcates 
certain mentalities in them that come to be identifiable with Singaporean-ness. The main 
character’s son, after hearing the story, stops asking his father to fight the charges. Instead, he too 
realizes that there is nothing to be gained by fighting even illogical charges, and when he grows 
up and receives his driving license, he promptly pays up whenever he is fined, no matter how 
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facetious the charge. A central part of the appeal of both this play and Coffin lay in their use of 
humor to portray the absurdity in everyday life. Perhaps one reason for the success of the plays 
was the way in which, by getting people to laugh at problems they typically took for granted, the 
plays could get people to re-examine their conceptions of what types of bureaucracy were 
absolutely necessary and what types were obstructionist.  
We therefore see that there were significant and important works which dealt overtly with 
political questions. Often these political questions were tied up with issues of national identity. 
Not all works were so direct in their criticism, though. To some other works, politics was incidental 
to the larger problems of identity itself. 
b. Finding a Voice 
In Chapter One we saw how important the question of language was to the government. Their 
recognition of the power of language to exert holds on peoples’ primordial racial or religious 
identities had led them to try to enforce policies, such as the eradication of dialects. The problem 
of language and the use of language was one that playwrights and artists encountered from the 
early days of independence. 
The name of Robert Yeo’s “Singapore trilogy” suggests that the three plays are the most 
representative out of all works of Singaporean drama; nevertheless, their appeal was not universal. 
Even though some did greatly appreciate his work and even wrote in to the papers to praise the 
plays,184 several later playwrights (for example) commented that they had problems with the plays, 
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in particular, in the way in which they used language. Alvin Tan, who would later go on to set up 
The Necessary Stage in 1987 and become an acclaimed director of Singaporean plays, commented: 
I didn’t like Robert Yeo’s work… although it was significant because it captured the 
times, but I didn’t like [it] because the language was stilted… when I read the thing I 
can’t finish the play, because they don’t have the language vehicle.185 
Haresh Sharma, Tan’s frequent collaborator and a celebrated Singapore playwright of the late 
1980s (and onwards; he is still currently active) also raised the same issue in a separate interview. 
Without naming Yeo specifically, he criticized earlier Singaporean playwrights:  
If you read some of these plays, the characters speak like they’re not Singaporean… a 
farmer, or something like that… [can speak] in very flowery language that is almost more 
eloquent than an Oxford graduate! It was very difficult to capture the voice – I think 
when you read it, even at the time, you think it’s not very good.186 
Tan and Sharma had both grown up watching and reading the works of Yeo and his 
contemporaries, and felt that they had failed to capture the voice of Singaporeans. Notably, they 
felt that the language had been too sophisticated, the expressions too complex, for a people who 
(in their view) used simpler, perhaps cruder, and less pretentious, method of expressing 
themselves. In One Year Back Home, for instance, Gerald, an engineer in the Singapore Armed 
Forces, is considering emigrating to Australia, despite the fact that many people want him to stay 
in Singapore. Recalling that his commanding officer had implored him to stay, Gerald comments: 
‘Sure, but he wants me to stay not because of my personal need or friendship, but because 
the Army needs engineers. It’s good for the country, he says. It always comes down to 
some abstract idea, an obligation to something impersonal.’ 
When reminded by his girlfriend, Hua, that his parents also want him to stay, Gerald retorts: 
‘Oh, God! Don’t remind me of that obligation. I suppose you are going to tell me that I 
should be a good son. I should honor my parents… you are like the rest. What you want 
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me to do is not to be loyal to my parents but to honor the idea of filial piety. Another 
abstraction!’187 
Needless to say, in an age where English had not yet gained traction to the degree it now has, when 
Singapore was still very much a developing economy, the idea that the average army engineer 
would be able to speak eloquently and with great nuance about “abstractions” could easily have 
seemed improbable to theatre-goers such as Tan and Sharma.  
This is not to say that they felt that their countrymen were incapable of negotiating 
important political questions – the Singapore trilogy was, in fact, remarkable chiefly because of 
the way in which it dealt explicitly with questions of politics. The main problem was the language 
used. There are at least two aspects in which language mattered: one, the actual language used 
(English versus Chinese versus dialect, for instance); two, the choice of words, tone, and so on. It 
is interesting to note that the latter could become conflated with the content of characters’ concerns. 
The problem was not so much that Singaporeans were not believed to have grappled with those 
problems. Rather, the choice of expressions or words were taken to be indicative of a sophisticated 
or nuanced grasp and understanding of these problems, or level of education, which was generally 
felt to be inconsistent with that of the average Singaporean. The distinction is made particularly 
clear when contrasting the above sort of statements with the lines written by playwrights like 
Sharma. In his first work for The Necessary Stage, he wrote a play called Lanterns Never Go Out 
in 1987-88, about a female university student reading the humanities, Kah Wei, and the competing 
pressures in her life. When confronted with Kah Wei apparently acting rudely towards her mother, 
a relative berates Kah Wei’s mother: 
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‘See, Ah Leng, last time when she small, you not strict. Now see, don’t know how she talk 
to you. Then she study Arts course some more. How to get good pay?’188 
Despite grappling with important issues for Singaporeans, such as those of the respect due 
to parents and the proper upbringing of children, issues which could also have been explored in 
great detail and nuance, the play prioritizes the expression of these concerns in the way an average 
Singaporean would – through vernacular language. In particular, it emphasizes the use of 
colloquial grammar structures as a crucial part of the Singaporean identity. Commenting on this, 
Alvin Tan said: 
[Robert Yeo and his contemporaries] were looking for a local identity, but these people 
were Anglophiles themselves. Whereas Haresh and myself belonged to a generation where 
we were confident in our Singlish [Singaporean colloquial English] and we weren’t 
apologetic about it. We spoke different kinds of Singlish and we were rooted in the brand 
of it. We also knew we could code switch and we could also speak standard English… 
[Robert Yeo and contemporaries] want a local identity but you’re not rooted in the local. 
You’re in your ivory tower. So it was very painful, but that was the thing where we could 
learn and we were dissatisfied, but it was a springboard for us because we could think about 
how we could adjust it to make it work.189 
Methodology became important for those like Tan and Sharma. As Tan mentioned, they 
became motivated by the problems they saw with earlier playwrights. Their methods were 
explicitly intended to fix these problems. Tan recounts: 
Haresh asked an actress, he was writing a Teochew mother character, he wrote in English, 
and he asked the actress who is Teochew-speaking to speak the meaning in Teochew, and 
then asked her to translate the Teochew sentence literally into English so the syntax is of 
course broken English. Then he would adjust the English line to make it palatable to the 
listener so they could understand, but the rhythm, the syntax, would work… [a Malay 
mother would speak in English] but the syntax is Malay, the rhythm is Malay, but it is in 
English.190 
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The languages used in the play mattered immensely as well. Part of the reason why Kuo 
Pao Kun was influential was his negotiation of different linguistic territories – Kuo recognized that 
it was important to explore the tensions involved in the different languages used in Singapore. In 
Chapter 1, we looked at the way in which the government understood the problems posed by 
languages, leading to policies such as those attempting to stamp out the widespread use of dialect. 
Kuo’s work tackled this problem explicitly, approaching it from the angle of the social implications 
of such policies.  
In 1988, Kuo wrote a play entitled Mama Looking For Her Cat. The play was multilingual, 
with characters speaking English, Mandarin, and dialects. In fact the whole point of the play was 
to think about the generation gap created when parents and grandparents spoke primarily (or even 
only) dialect, but their children and grandchildren were prevented from learning that dialect due 
to government policies emphasizing the use of English and their “Mother Tongue.” The play did 
this by demonstrating the inability of the children to understand their mother – failing to understand 
their mother’s loneliness and sadness, even failing to understand the mother’s closeness to her pet 
cat as a means of alleviating that loneliness. Instead, in an interesting subversion of usual 
stereotypes, it was the children who were superstitious and suspicious of what their mother was up 
to: 
Children: (in English and Mandarin) What cat? 
Ah! So that’s what’s been bothering her. 
See? I told you, that cat’s a jinx. 
Alamak [expression of annoyance], she’s really too much now. 
I’ve told her how many times: No cats in HDB [Housing Development Board] flats. And 
now she’s gone crazy with this black cat!  
I knew there must be something to it! 
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I think this cat’s causing her to behave very strangely. 
Yah, must get rid of the damn animal. First, it made people allergic, now it’s inviting my 
mother to go out at night. Too much! Too much! 
They go crazy with anger, looking everywhere for the cat which they believe is the cause 
of all the unhappiness… Mother is alerted. She marches over… 
Mama: That’s enough! Enough! I said that’s enough!... So now you’re very big already. 
Everyone’s got wings now. Now you don’t need me anymore, right? So I can’t even have 
a cat for myself, right? Why can’t I even have a cat? Is it so much to ask? Can’t I have even 
a cat?191 
The chaos and emotional intensity of this scene was further brought out by the use of both 
English and Mandarin, used randomly – especially since Kuo did not specify which lines should 
be spoken by which children and in what language, creating overlapping voices as the children all 
struggle to be heard.  
This jarring scene, and the clash with the mother, is made even more striking when 
considering the earlier demonstrated relationship between the mother and the children. The 
opening scene of the play has the children and the mother speaking entirely in the Hokkien dialect, 
as the children eagerly clamored for their mother to tell them a story, which she did in the form of 
the fable of the race between the rabbit and the tortoise. She exhorted the children to learn the 
value of hard work and perseverance from the story. However, one child decided that (s)he dislikes 
the story, reformulating the story so that the rabbit, in his/her words, “won by bumping the tortoise 
and turning him upside down like this and left him roasting in the sun.” The other children found 
this amusing and start to mimic the rabbit and tortoise, with disastrous consequences: 
Everyone finds this proposition very funny and they all turn to imitating the Rabbit, 
jumping fiercely and bumping into each other aggressively. Mother tries to stop them but 
fails. In the end, she herself is bumped over. She seems to have been knocked unconscious.  
Bumping into one another, they eventually all end on their backs. Initially finding the 
upside-down position good fun, they gradually begin to struggle to turn over; but when 
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they find they cannot, and as if the sun begins to shine hotter and hotter, their struggle 
becomes more and more anxious. Very quickly, all the fun has gone and utter desperation 
takes over. 
One by one, as if fighting a life-and-death battle, they manage to turn over to regain their 
normal balance – totally cleansed of any boastfulness. Now they are all on their fours with 
their faces on the floor.  
Mama wakes up, struggles to stand up, moves over to slump onto a low bamboo stool. 
Then the children, one by one, begin to wake up, to discover Mama missing. They speak in 
either Mandarin or English. 
Their rejection of their mother’s lesson drawn from tradition quickly gave way to disaster, 
not just for them, but for the mother as well. Their disorientation quickly followed with an abrupt 
transition to the use of English and Mandarin instead of dialect – and this was the point at which 
their relationship began to fracture. In fact, the mother, while looking for her lost cat, found more 
in common with an elderly Indian man who spoke only Tamil, and who had also lost his cat, while 
she spoke only Hokkien. Despite their inability to understand each other’s language, they 
eventually managed (after a struggle) to achieve some sort of communication. On one hand, it 
spoke to the universality of the experience of displacement; but on the other, the possibility of 
communication despite language barriers. The play culminated with the children effectively 
lynching the cat, blaming it for their mother’s loneliness: 
They start a frantic search for the cat. They rush in all directions, going faster and faster 
until it becomes a crazy hunt. Finally one of them spots the cat and everyone joins the 
chase. Encircling it, they stalk the cat, each pounding on the animal with his or her body, 
piling on top of each other in a heap above the stricken cat. 
Mama yells her disapproval above the horrible cries of the cat, kneeling in front of them. 
Mama: Don’t do that! Don’t do that! Don’t do that! 
But it is too late. Everything is quiet now. 
Getting up, Mama goes to the pile of bodies. Pulling away the bodies one by one, she finally 
discovers the cat. Picking it up preciously, she begins to cuddle the animal as if it is her 
child. 
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As she walks off, she sings the ‘One Night Grow One Inch’ lullaby. And before she finally 
disappears into the darkness, she begins to tell the cat the story of ‘The Rabbit and the 
Tortoise’, reminding the animal in her lap to work hard, and to persevere on and on. 
Blackout. 
With the mother singing the same lullaby she had sung to her children at the start of the play to the 
cat, and telling the cat the same story, the play spoke volumes about the sense of loss and 
dislocation experienced by those whose language had been officially alienated by the state. 
This is not to say that only plays using multiple languages could capture the essence of the 
Singaporean voice on stage. The problems created by the state’s official promotion of a dual-
language policy were also brought out in plays mainly, or even solely, in the English language. In 
Sharma’s Lanterns Never Go Out, the main character, Kah Wei, is employed as a tutor for a child 
who is having trouble with learning Mandarin: 
Chorus: Ring, ring. [x4] 
Kah Wei: Hello? 
B: Miss Low? This is Gilbert’s father. 
Kah Wei: Yes, Mr. Tay? Is there something wrong? 
B: Gilbert didn’t do very well for his last test. Now, Miss Low, you have been tutoring him 
for quite some time now and… can I be frank?... Well, I expect some results. I’m not trying 
to tell you how to do your job. I hope you don’t think so, but he is still very far behind in 
his class. 
Kah Wei: I understand the situation, Mr. Tay, but Mandarin is a very difficult language to 
learn. It takes a lot of time and effort practicing.  
B: Are you saying that Gilbert is not putting in any effort? Because if he is not, then… 
Kah Wei: No, Mr. Tay. It is difficult for Gilbert because he is not exposed to a Chinese-
speaking environment. 
B: Of course not. I don’t want my son to hang around Chinese-speaking people. He is 
English-educated. 
Kah Wei: Mr. Tay, if you want Gilbert to improve, he must speak more Mandarin. 
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B: I want him to do well. I want you to help him. [Pause] Can you give him extra lessons 
on Saturday afternoons? I will definitely pay extra. 
Kah Wei: Does Gilbert want extra lessons? Doesn’t he have [extra-curricular activites]? 
B: I’ve already told him to stop his band practices. So now he will have the time. [Pause] 
Can you start this Saturday? 
Much in this segment would resonate with audiences – the creation of a chasm between 
the apparently lower-class, Chinese-educated, and the higher-class, more well-off, English 
educated; the learning of a language for the sake of fulfilling a formal requirement instead of 
learning it for its own sake or for its utility (why learn Chinese if Gilbert is not supposed to “hang 
around Chinese-speaking people”?) and nevertheless the demand for excellence in the field despite 
it not being of use (“I want him to do well” versus “I want him to speak better Mandarin”); the 
emphasis on academics and what is practical above non-academic activities and so on. All these 
themes and more are evoked, and Singaporeans watching the play would sympathize with the 
concerns brought out. 
  Another example would be Emily of Emerald Hill, by Stella Kon, first staged in 1985. Later 
referred to as a “breakthrough” which was “canonical in any history of Singapore drama,” Emily 
has become venerated as being among the best and most representative pieces of drama ever 
written in and about Singapore, written by a playwright who had already proven herself by winning 
first place in the Ministry of Culture’s Drama Competitions three times in the 1980s, though her 
work had never been produced before 1985. It was therefore an embarrassment when Kon’s work 
was first produced not in Singapore, but in Malaysia. Very quickly, the play was taken up for 
production at the Singapore Drama Festival later that year (1985). The play was extremely well 
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received, and was highly influential. Sharma said of the play: “Everyone still wants to stage it 
today… because of the timelessness of Emily and its relevance.”192  
In this predominantly English play, there is only one character, Emily. Starting out the play 
in the 1950s as an orphan, abandoned by her mother, she is married to a rich man at age 14, and 
soon becomes the matriarch of the mansion on Emerald Hill. Despite her best intentions (which 
manifest to some extent in an overbearing demeanor and perhaps almost tyrannical control of the 
lives of her family and servants193), she ends up estranged from her husband, and her son commits 
suicide. Max Le Blond referred to:  
a crucial ambivalence in [Emily’s] character. Emily’s quest was for affirmation, emotional 
security, a coherent sense of identity, love; but this translates itself, within the course of 
her career in an oppressively patriarchal Gan household, into an insatiable hunger for 
power. She pursues a domestic-emotional politics in which the need for self-validation 
becomes compromised by a concomitant negation of the needs and individualities of 
others. The oppressed and marginalized figure, in finding her centre, becomes the 
oppressor. 
The end of the play sees Emily sitting alone in a mansion once populated by her entire 
extended family, wistfully contemplating her life, even as the world of old Peranakan194 mansions 
and large, luxurious gardens around her steadily makes way for industrial, urban, and modern 
construction projects. Various commentators have identified Emily as one of the most significant 
dramatic inventions in Singaporean history. One scholar writes: “The assuredness of a rooted past, 
springing from her peranakan heritage, lends depth to Emily, easily the most convincing character 
who has so far appeared in Singapore English theatre.”195  
                                                     
192 Haresh Sharma. Interview with Shawn Teo. Digital recording. The Necessary Stage. July 22nd, 2013.). 
193 Stella Kon, Emily of Emerald Hill: A One-woman play by Stella Kon (Singapore: Constellation Books, 2002): 64-67. 
194 Peranakan: Chinese settlers in Southeast Asia, particularly in Singapore, who adopted parts of Malay and Western culture. 
195 Jit, Krishen, “Modern Theatre in Singapore: A Preliminary Survey,” in(2002). Emily of Emerald Hill: A One-woman play by 
Stella Kon. (Singapore: Constellation Books, 2002): 61-63. 
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What about Emily made her “convincing” in a way that other characters were not? On one 
hand, as before, the language used by Emily mattered significantly. In particular Emily’s ability to 
code switch between colloquial English and formal English demonstrated a skill which many 
Singaporeans would have been familiar with, if not comfortable or proficient. The beginning of 
Act 2 provides a good example of this, as she places calls and conducts visits to multiple people, 
sometimes to order food and sometimes to ask friends for favors, switching the language she uses 
depending on who she speaks to. When she visits the fishmonger at the market, she has no problem 
communicating in colloquial English: 
See your prawns… Cheh, all small ones! You have some good big ones hidden at the back 
somewhere, you bring them out for me. All right, five katis, how much? Four dollars, you 
crazy ah? I give you three dollars can already. Cannot lah, three-seventy too much also… 
She goes on to the next stall. 
Ah Soh! How are you, chiak pah boey? Ya I’m fine, family is fine, chin ho, chin ho. I want 
to buy sixteen cucumbers today, half a kati of long beans, half a kati of French beans. Yes, 
you guessed correctly, I’m making achar for the New Year…196 
In segments like these she moves freely between colloquial English scattered with phrases drawn 
from dialects (“chiak pah boey”, for instance, which means: “have you eaten?”), to more standard 
English when she meets an expatriate friend: 
Oh, good morning Mrs Schneider, how nice to run into you! Yes indeed, I shall send you 
some orchids for the Church Bazaar as usual. Not at all, with my sons at the Anglo-Chinese 
School I’m very glad to make my little contribution. Do give the Bishop my best wishes 
won’t you? 
We see from this that the demands for an authentic voice weren’t demands that characters 
speak the language of the poor, dispossessed, or uneducated – Emily is none of those things 
(technically she is uneducated in the sense that she left school when she was very young, but she 
                                                     
196 Kon, Stella, Emily of Emerald Hill (1983). 
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is extraordinarily sharp, and in her world of family politics, extremely proficient). Kah Wei, from 
Lanterns, has a university education and a decent job. Rather, language use was one key insight 
into the psyche of characters which helped audience members identify with (or fail to identify 
with) characters. It was not the only means, though. 
The way in which the play itself was staged naturally lent power to the messages sent by 
the play. Max Le Blond, who directed the first Singaporean staging of Emily at the Drama Festival 
in 1985, spoke of how the stage was set up to enhance the impact of the lines. One example he 
gave was of the “imposingly-sized patriarchal chair” set up at mid-centre stage, designed and 
placed specifically to function literally and figuratively as the “seat of power within the Gan 
household.” Emily ends the play seated alone in the chair, having gained power but lost much 
along the way, in a scene which was sure to have left a vivid impact on theatregoers.  
Furthermore, the depiction of circumstances which the audience could sympathize with 
was often a good way to connect with the Singaporean public. Code-switching, as in Emily, was 
one such example. As Singapore opened up to immigrants, and the government started to push 
campaigns to erase dialects and colloquial English, the phenomenon of having to force oneself to 
speak “correctly” in front of certain people would have been familiar to many. Le Blond felt that 
the situations in which Emily found herself, and the wider environment, were eminently 
identifiable to the Singaporean audience. In particular, he found that: 
[A] source of the play’s power and appeal is in its harnessing and evocation of a series of 
temporal motifs: history and folk belief, youth vs age; tradition vs modernization. These 
motifs are concretised by refracting poignantly recognizable facets of the life and times of 
pre-war, wartime and post-war Singapore through the loving rendered microcosm of an 
extended Peranakan family with Emily at its centre. The play thus establishes, in vividly 
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particularized detail, a whole way of life which it enacts, celebrates, critiques, and finally, 
elegises.197 
The scenes of Emily at the market, Emily busily making arrangements and so on would all 
have struck a chord with the audience. Situations, though, were not simply a result of the 
geographic location that characters found themselves in. Often, they could be made by the 
personalities of characters – Emily’s overbearing concern for her son’s well-being, and demand 
that he obey her in all things, would not have seemed alien to audiences. In fact the sight of a 
mother berating her son for choosing a course of life deemed to be impractical, demanding not just 
obedience but recognition of her superior wisdom, and invocation of the motto that “mother knows 
best” would have been very familiar to audiences. The situation here is strikingly similar to that 
faced by Kah Wei in Sharma’s Lanterns Never Go Out, although the complaints in that case come 
more from relatives than from Kah Wei’s mother.  
In fact, the role of women in society and the struggles they faced was a common theme in 
several productions, including Lanterns and Emily. Another play which discussed similar issues 
was No Foul Play, put up by The Third Stage in 1983. The play centered on the life of Alice, a 
Chinese girl facing numerous family problems. One particular confrontation with her father, over 
her desire to go to university, is demonstrative of the conservative attitudes of some parents 
towards female children: 
Father: How do you expect us to support you to U? I don’t have the money. I tell you, I 
don’t have the money. 
Alice: I’ll work very hard and get very good results so that I can get the scholarship. I 
promise you, I’ll work very hard. 
Father: Why aren’t you happy? Why must you go to the U? You’ll probably get married 
in a few years’ time. Why study so hard? And wasting money… 
                                                     
197 Kon, Emily of Emerald Hill 
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Mother: Will you just give her a chance? I think we can manage somehow. IF the worst 
comes to the worst, we can borrow some money. 
Father: Borrow money so a daughter can go to the U? What for?198 
The contrast is especially marked because the father had placed enormous pressure on his 
son, Alice’s younger brother, to study hard to go to university. His daughter, however, was 
accorded no such privilege. The discrimination in favor of male children was common at the time, 
and was something many Singaporeans would have easily related to. One of Catherine Lim’s 
stories, aptly entitled Male Child, is about a man who is depressed because of his failure to produce 
a male heir, wondering if it was a “punishment for sin.”199 He blames his wife and has an affair. 
Under immense emotional pressure, his wife agrees that if the next child is a girl again, the man 
can take his mistress as another wife, and the first wife would be “subject” to her (in the hierarchy 
of wives). Ironically, then, the short story ends with the man standing outside the delivery room, 
straining to hear the cries of the child as it is born, hoping that it is a girl.  Catherine Lim 
commented:  
It’s just part of our history that we’ve always been a patriarchal society. And when I was a 
little girl I think I grew up seeing a lot of abuse of women. Women terrified of their 
husbands, wife beating… My mother never had an education, because she was female!... I 
could see [discrimination], in little things, especially in Chinese culture. Always in my 
stories I would wonder, hey, as a little girl, why are women’s bodies dirty? Women were 
not allowed at certain fishing sites; a menstruating woman, if she went into a temple, she 
could be struck dead by the temple god. My mother used to scream at the maids if they 
mixed up the men’s clothes with the women’s clothes in the washtub, said it would bring 
bad luck. And I used to wonder, wait a minute, what is this?... you see fellow women 
suffering because of their gender, you have to write. I’d say it’s a moral duty to write.200 
The link between the plight of women and education was particularly strong, especially 
because of a major debate in the 1980s. In early 1984, the government introduced a new scheme 
                                                     
198 Soon Neo, Lim, and Souk Yee, Wong. No Foul Play (1983) 
199 Catherine Lim, Little Ironies: Stories of Singapore. (Essex: Heinemann, 1978): 38 
200 Catherine Lim. Interview with Shawn Teo. Digital Recording. Centrepoint. July 23rd, 2013. 
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which would soon come to be known as the “Graduate Mothers Scheme.” Under this policy, a 
woman graduate with three children would be given highest priority in the registration exercise for 
pre-primary and primary schools. These exercises were (and have been) the means by which 
parents got their children into pre-primary and primary schools, and are highly competitive. Goh 
Keng Swee, Minister of Education and Deputy Prime Minister, explained that the aim was to 
“encourage those who are highly-educated and can afford to have larger families to do so.” In 
contrast, in order to keep the families of the less-educated small, “priority will continue to be given 
to them if they are prepared to be sterilized after one or two children.”201 Mothers would have to 
show their certificates, and “ministry officials [would] check the mothers’ certificates against a list 
of recognized universities and approved professional qualifications.”202 The reasoning for this was 
that “graduate mothers produce nine times the number of gifted children than the general 
population.”203 
In the face of domestic outrage,204 the government defended its stance vigorously, claiming 
that it needed to correct the problems presented by a “lopsided birth pattern” which saw more 
highly-educated women having smaller families than less educated women. Ong Teng Cheong, 
then National Trades Union Congress Secretary-General and Minister without Portfolio, stated 
that the danger with the current trend was that Singapore would “eventually have a smaller pool 
                                                     
201 Caroline Boey and Bertilla Pereira, “Encouraging well-educated to have larger families,” Singapore Monitor, January 24th, 
1984, 2. http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/singmonitor19840124-1.2.7.aspx 
202 “Graduate mothers must show proof: registration will be at ministry,” The Straits Times, January 24th, 1984, 1. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19840124-1.2.4.aspx  
203 “Dr Goh Keng Swee defends the school admission priority scheme,” Singapore Monitor, March 13th, 4. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/singmonitor19840313-1.2.5.8.aspx  
204 Several examples include: “Scheme may produce snobs,” The Straits Times, March 14th, 1984, 11. 
http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19840314-1.2.17.29.29.aspx.  
“Students’ union petition,” The Straits Times, January 28th, 1984, 9. 
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of talented people from which to draw to run the country.”205 Despite this, many publicly wondered 
why the scheme covered the education level of the mother and not of the father, and many more 
pointed out that the scheme was highly discriminatory and would be ineffective anyway. The issue 
became a hot matter of debate in the December 1984 elections. Catherine Lim called it 
“draconian,” saying that the scheme was “something so hideous that [the government] doesn’t 
want to be reminded of it.”206 Despite its fervent defense of the policy at the time, the following 
year (1985), the government announced in Parliament (to applause) that it was rescinding the 
policy.207 While Dr. Tony Tan, who had become Minister for Education, recognized that the 
scheme had aroused “anxiety and resentment” in many Singaporeans both graduate and non-
graduate, the primary reason for the removal of the policy was the government having received 
responses from graduate mothers saying that the scheme would not encourage them to have more 
children.208 Given that the government refused to recognize a fundamental problem with the 
discriminatory nature of the policy, civil society’s victory was partial at best. 
Regardless, the effects of social attitudes and of governmental policies were strongly felt 
by women, and it is unsurprising that plays such as Emily would have struck a chord with 
audiences. Indeed the question of family relations often became a metaphor, as well, for the 
paternalistic mindset of the government, especially with relation to the supposedly wayward youth 
who were, in the eyes of their parents, sometimes all too susceptible to corrupting influences, 
sexual or otherwise, from forces outside the family/country – such as the “West.” Interestingly, 
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the discrimination against and oppression of women were inextricably linked to the similar 
suffering of men. In No Foul Play, for example, Alice, thinking she is unloved and unwanted by 
her parents, bitterly compares her suffering with that of her brother, Kwong Meng, who she thinks 
is favored by their parents. It is not clear at all that Alice has it worse: 
Kwong Meng: [Mother and Father] only use me. 
Alice: Use you? 
Kwong Meng: In their eyes, I’m the little boy who must one day grow up and be a 
successful man. So they can boast to their friends and neighbors how wonderful it is to 
have such a good son. 
Alice: Maybe that’s the only thing they can boast of. I think they really love you. At least 
they love you more than their two daughters, so why are you complaining? 
Kwong Meng: If they really love me, they won’t put so much pressure on me. They won’t 
force me to study when I can’t. They won’t force me to do things I don’t like to do. Study! 
Study! Study! Mother forces me to. Father forces me to. 
Alice: But you must think of your future… 
Kwong Meng: That’s what Father said the night he caned me. Study hard. Pass your 
exams. Get your certificate. Otherwise you’ll be like me. A laborer all your life… 
Alice: Father can be harsh sometimes. That’s because… it’s his secret ambition to have his 
son go to the U. So he can be proud of you.  
Kwong Meng: But I suffered. I suffered the night he caned me. It was terrible. It was 
painful; on my body, on my spirit. I can’t help it if I fail in some subjects that I am not 
good at. I’m not that smart. 
By the end of this scene, it emerges that Kwong Meng is actually already dead – driven to 
suicide by the emotional pressure from his parents and teachers to perform well academically when 
he simply could not live up to their hopes.209 Alice, at the end of the play, takes her own life, too, 
a victim of competing pressures and expectations she cannot endure. The play ends with an 
announcement, the coroner’s findings regarding Alice’s death, ironically remarking that there was 
“no foul play” involved, thus raising the question of the extent to which society as a whole can be 
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held morally culpable for the trauma suffered by both young men and women who have to live up 
to its expectations. 
The expectations placed on men were not merely academic – one major “men’s issue” 
which was fertile ground for the arts scene was military service. All males in Singapore had to 
serve two years of National Service – essentially, conscription. Tan argues, correctly, that National 
Service was often seen as a “rite of passage into both adult manhood and full (voting) citizenship, 
when males learn to assume the role of protectors both of their families and of their nation.” In 
particular National Service was thought to guard against complacency and the “softness” created 
by affluence. At the same time, Tan argued that National Service, by “regulating male 
aggressiveness,” could provide men “with a common stock of experiences that can be politically 
controlled as powerful tools of socialization.”210 The fact that all Singaporean males had the 
experience of the army made discussion of it a particularly easy way to relate to audiences, 
especially since it was not only the men going through national service who were deeply affected 
by it, but also their mothers, sisters, girlfriends etc. who would have seen themselves in the 
supporting cast depicted in productions like Michael Chiang’s acclaimed Army Daze. 
First performed in June 1987, Army Daze has since become a major hit in the history of 
Singaporean drama productions, being constantly restaged for new audiences. The play was a 
comedy, following the exploits of a group of new recruits and their supporting cast (officers and 
trainers, family members etc.) as they struggle to get through BMT (Basic Military Training). The 
ensemble was rife with Singaporean stereotypes, drawing on shared experiences not just of days 
spent in the military, but of stereotypical categories of Singaporeans. Such stock characters litter 
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the cast – one example is Corporal Ong, who constantly quotes nuggets of Hokkien folk wisdom 
and uses clichéd lines in scolding his soldiers, which Singaporean men who had passed through 
the army would have been familiar with (e.g. to a recruit struggling on an obstacle course: “Recruit 
Krishna! Stop wasting time. My grandmother can run faster than you!”) Another such character 
represented a stereotype of the ah beng, a stereotype of a young Chinese man, often unrefined, 
crude, flashy, materialistic, uneducated, and heavily reliant on Mandarin and dialect for speech. 
Remarkably, the character is actually named Ah Beng. The script introduces him at the gathering 
point for new recruits to be escorted to their training camp: 
Ah Beng, dressed in his big baggy black ensemble, walks in by himself. He’s carrying a 
Nam Ho Travel overnight-bag. He moves to the front of the stage, squats in a corner, 
observing the people around him. He takes out his sunglasses and puts them on. He pulls 
out his plastic hair-brush from his back pocket and combs his hair. Fluff, fluff, pat, pat. 
Tucks the brush back into the pocket.211 
This entire sequence drew on cultural character stereotypes – all the actions taken by Ah 
Beng were commonly associated with ah bengs in popular depictions. By introducing the character 
in such a way, the play effectively allowed the audience an immediate insight into the character 
by letting the audience know that he fit into a defined mold. They could thus infer things about Ah 
Beng’s character without being explicitly told. At the same time, a contrast is struck between 
characters like Ah Beng, who is considered crude and uncouth, and those like Malcolm’s mother, 
who have an almost comical obsession with being refined and “high class.” When the sergeant 
arrives to collect the boys to take them to their training camp, Mrs Png implores her son: “Quick, 
quick, look intelligent. Otherwise they will put you with the low IQ boys.”212 This obsession with 
class, wealth and refinement would not have seemed alien to Singaporean audiences, being a neat 
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parallel to the government’s emphasis on economic growth and shunning of dialects (which ah 
bengs often used). The audience was thus invited to laugh not only at their own privilege, but at 
their own tendency to look down on characters like Ah Beng as exemplifying the crude and 
undeveloped. Malcolm’s mother’s first meeting with Ah Beng plays up the interaction between 
the two: 
Malcolm: Ah Beng, this is my mother. 
Ah Beng: Oh, hello Auntie. Your son very good. Very on the ball. Never twang one. [He 
doesn’t slack off] 
Mrs Png: (looks disapprovingly at Ah Beng) Hello. Never what? On what ball? (Turns to 
Malcolm and whispers urgently) See what I mean? See what happens if you don’t act 
intelligent? End up with people who talk funny. 
The play spends most of its time, though, on scenes of the boys undergoing training. Most 
of these are used as comic relief. At the same time, some would have struck a very personal note 
with theatregoers. In particular, Krishna, a recruit, becomes extremely worried that his girlfriend, 
Lathi, would break up with him during his time in the army as they spend time apart. Ironically it 
is Ah Beng who offers the best advice among all of Krishna’s platoon mates, albeit crudely 
phrased, and helps comfort Krishna. The earthy and unrefined do, after all, manage to eke out a 
place for themselves, providing what the classy and wealthy cannot. All in all, Army Daze exerted 
such a strong pull on the public imagination that it sold out its performances and was re-staged in 
August 1987.213 
We have thus seen a sample of the ways in which authors and playwrights tried to bring 
out a Singaporean voice in their productions. Whether it was through the use of language, stock 
characters, familiar settings, or commonly experienced conflicts, the appeal of these plays was 
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obvious – Singaporeans identified with them. Someone, at least, had managed to bring out the 
Singaporean voice, even if it wasn’t always clear how to define it. 
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Conclusion 
To end the story here feels almost like a pity. We leave the actors and artists, directors and 
policymakers, writers and politicians at a cusp of a flurry of developments in the arts scene. In 
1990, for example, the National Arts Council was established, a new body which liaised directly 
with major figures in the arts scene. Not all was flowers and ovations, though. The very real 
undercurrent of fear and loathing – of that which was seen to be morally corrupting – was very 
much alive in the city-state.  
For instance, Alvin Tan and Haresh Sharma’s The Necessary Stage got into trouble with 
the government in the early 1990s when they were commissioned to do a play on mental illness 
by the Ministry of Health, which gave them substantial funding (S$40,000) for the project. They 
spent months doing fieldwork and research on the plight of those suffering from mental illnesses, 
visiting mental health institutions, care centers, speaking to sufferers and their families and so on. 
The result was a script for a play titled Off Centre. When the script was submitted for approval by 
the Ministry of Health, though, things went badly: 
The script went to the board of directors at MOH, and the board of directors were not arts-
trained. They freaked out… there were two co-protagonists… The boy doesn’t want 
medication… he’s very smart, medication numbs him so he doesn’t want to take it. He’s 
manic depressive, and his depression became worse because he wasn’t taking the 
medication. So he ended up committing suicide, but in a flashback [it was revealed that] 
his first breakdown was in the army. They didn’t want it to be in the army, because MOH 
cannot commission a play that puts another ministry in a bad light. They didn’t want… 
suicide, it’s too deep a thing, so they wanted us to take away the major illnesses and deal 
with OCD. Simpler illnesses. And they had several other things they wanted to change, 
which we felt would compromise the work.214 
This was not something which Tan and Sharma were prepared to accept. Perhaps they had 
misunderstood the reasons behind the commission, but the fact remained that they had spent 
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months of blood, sweat and tears learning and retelling stories which were in many ways very real 
indeed. When asked about their response to the Ministry, Tan laughed: “We told the Ministry to 
take back their fucking money… We said we didn’t want to compromise our artwork, please take 
back your money, we’ll go on how we are.” The Necessary Stage managed to scrape together the 
resources to go ahead with the production despite the government’s withdrawal of its support – in 
fact, the company was the subject of an investigation as the government “was wondering how 
come [TNS] could go on without the $40,000… they suspected that money was coming in from 
overseas to fund it.” The specter of a foreign power having control of Singapore’s media and arts 
scene had still not gone away. In the end, though, Tan and Sharma had the last laugh. Not only did 
the Singapore Association of Mental Illness, which was a government body, support the work as 
an accurate depiction of the struggles of those afflicted with mental illnesses, but 14 years after 
Off Centre went on stage for the first time, it became the first Singaporean play assigned as a text 
for the national ‘O’ Level literature examinations (to be taken by those leaving Secondary school 
at the ages of 16-17).  
Much more could be said about the other things happening at this time – the advent of the 
Fringe Festival, or the government’s clamping down on performance art after one artist decided to 
clip his own pubic hair as part of a performance, leading to a “whole generation of performance 
artists having to leave the country,”215 or the growing emphasis by the government on writing 
patriotic songs in pop or rock styles in order to appeal to the changing population. However, all 
this has to be a story for a different time, and a different place. Just as Zhou Enlai is reputed to 
have said when asked about his opinion on the effects of the French Revolution, it may be too 
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early to tell, from a historical point of view, the real nature of events as recent as the late 1990s 
and their impacts. Events reaching much further back into history continue to have tremendous 
repercussions – the 1987 crackdown on the “Marxist conspiracy,” for instance, continues to occupy 
a central place in the imaginations of civil society activists; the government’s delicately crafted 
narrative of the difficulty of walking the tightrope, always running the risk of falling into 
communal riots and chaos, continues to receive much buy-in and support from the population.  
If anything, this should caution us against accepting any of the points of view presented in 
this thesis at face value, especially those of the author. This paper has attempted to remain as 
neutral as possible on almost every conceivable debatable point. None of this should be read as 
expressing support for or disapproval of any particular government policy, artwork, art form, 
approach or philosophy of any individual artist or writer etc. As mentioned in the introduction, a 
good part of the thesis is concerned with trying to understand the personal experiences of many of 
those who were deeply involved with the controversies and events depicted herein. Where 
possible, opposing points of view were highlighted (e.g. the contrasting opinions of Choy and 
Rajaratnam on Rajaratnam’s treatment of Choy, presented in Chapter 2). At other times, one 
should remain vigilant when reading the accounts presented in this paper, recalling that other 
parties may have seen the issues very differently. 
Where does this thesis leave us, then? In the author’s opinion it leaves us with a 
Singaporean arts scene which, as it walked into the 1990s, was gradually becoming more confident 
not only in its power to influence society, but in its understanding of its own form and the society 
it lived in. As artists, writers, and directors began to appropriate more and more specialized and 
varied art forms, and began to think about their own philosophies of how they wanted their art to 
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interact with society (e.g. Alvin Tan’s view on how The Necessary Stage did not want to directly 
oppose the government), their treatment of the material which they were working with seems to 
have become more sophisticated. At the same time this sophistication was also due to what 
appeared to be a general awakening of Singaporean society in general, becoming more aware of 
what it saw as defining characteristics of citizenship (e.g. language? Serving the military?), which 
allowed artists to speak to society’s views more directly, either supporting or challenging them. In 
its determination to carve out a place for itself it had to contend with a government which believed 
(and continues to believe) firmly in the potentially tremendous harms that could arise from an 
unregulated arts scene. 
There are many roads one could take from here if one wished to explore the subject further. 
One could walk backwards into the past even further, looking at, for example, the roots of various 
traditional art styles to see how particular styles survived and adapted (or failed to survive and 
adapt). Lee’s work on the tradition of amateur Chinese opera in Singapore and its relation to 
Confucianism would be one example of a study in this vein, however, there are so many more art 
forms and many angles from which to approach them. 216 On the other hand, one could look 
forward past 1990 and take up the story where we left off. The ways in which history have been 
recorded and presented to the public have also not received much study. Only a small amount of 
work has been done in this area, most notably a recent study by Liu, Lawrence, and Ward on social 
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representations of history in both Singapore and Malaysia.217 Little analysis has been done on 
national education, for example – the focus of Sim and Print’s study is post-1997.218 Likewise, the 
role of museums has not been dissected sufficiently. One particular study, although rightly 
choosing to analyse in close detail things such as word choice and presentation of history in the 
Singapore Museum, did so with specific reference only to one permanent exhibition set up in 
1997.219  
If there is one thing which the reader should take away from this exploration, it is that the 
story is not quite as simple as academics and leaders would have us believe. Singapore was not 
and is not a ‘cultural desert,’ nor an island paradise where the arts grow unchecked and unimpeded; 
nor even a completely authoritarian state where everything done, said, or made by an artist or 
writer must go through a board of censors first. None of these portrayals do justice to the fraught 
and tense conflicts we have seen unfold. Still less do they help us understand the passion, drive, 
and fervor of many of those in the field who strove hard for what they believed in. Whether they 
were writers, directors, or politicians, most if not all of them were motivated by a shared love of 
the country (if not for all its laws and institutions, then at least its people and identity) and a sense 
of its importance. Their differing outlooks on how to proceed into the future were underpinned by 
a common determination that there be a future for the country. 
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By way of conclusion, we can perhaps think of the ways in which the artists tried to imagine 
the future. The narrative of the dangers of racial conflict offered a particularly striking vehicle 
through which they could articulate their view of Singapore’s future. While the government saw 
Singapore as perpetually running on a treadmill, with the dangers of racial clashes omnipresent 
and insurmountable, some chose to believe otherwise, and expressed their hopes in their art. They 
chose to look at Singapore’s past history – of fear, of uncertainty, of a life on the very edge – and 
wondered how a better world might emerge. The Necessary Stage wrote a play entitled Gemuk 
Girls, staged in 2008 to critical acclaim. Written about the effects that detention without trial (such 
as the 1987 arrests) had on family life, Alvin Tan said: 
Gemuk Girls is about the ISD [Internal Security Department – responsible for detention of 
supposed subversives, terrorists etc. without trial] and the people that were… the 
grandfather who was detained. The mother was a hippie, she grew up in the hippie period, 
and her daughter was an NGO activist, and became an MP and 20 years from now is the 
first female [Malay] Prime Minister of Singapore. When she [made] her National Day 
speech Singapore was in perfection. The speech was very moving, because it was the ideal 
Singapore and she talked about how Singapore has finally come to be.220 
The dream was there – a Singapore where racial harmony, so to speak, no longer existed 
as a concept because race itself no longer mattered. Improbable? Probably. Utopian? Almost 
certainly. And yet it was deeply rooted in real familial ties, conflicts, and emotions which were 
very familiar to audiences, and which was why it was very well-received. Singaporeans watching 
the play recognized some deep, important truths in the work which resonated deeply with them. 
The work was visionary indeed, but also spoke to real, present feelings. When discussing the 
utopian nature of the play – and other similar works of art – Alvin Tan laughed and said: 
Of course it won’t affect [Singapore now] big time, lah, but we still want to do the work. 
Because the work is deeper than just being anti-state,… it’s about mindset. So we don’t 
care if it reaches out to a smaller group of people. 40 years from now, when I die, another 
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group might redo our play because our play is published, then maybe it might have a bigger 
impact. I don’t look for results in my lifetime, I’m zen that way.221 
The work was certainly just a dream, but that isn’t necessarily a reason to discount it. After 
all, it was the same visionary fervor that led Lee Kuan Yew and his compatriots to take on a task 
which seemed just as impossible to them in August 1965. From that dream and their dedication 
came an improbable state which not just survived, but thrived.  
Who, then, could say what might come next? 
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